2024 Draft - Part 1 - History (and my experience) Lesson

 OK, let's clear up one thing right now:  The draft is NOT a crap shoot.  Maybe it was back in the day, when everything was a scout's gut and a little video.  The first 50 years of the draft led to only about 50% of players selected first overall in the draft making a real mark in the majors with those numbers getting even lower later in the first round.  Look back on the futility of most of the early drafts by the Guardians and you can see how pathetic drafts were back then.

Is the baseball less certain than the draft in other sports? Obviously!  Guys can take 4-7 years to develop.  That is a career in other sports.   Guys in the NFL go right to the show and guys all the way down to the 7th round play in the NFL, some very effectively, in their draft year.   The time to gratification in the NBA draft is much shorter than in MLB, as guys play huge roles in their draft years, but even there the end of the 1st round & in the 2nd round has become, in some cases, a joke.    The NHL is probably closest to MLB but only recently has it become more common for guys in the MLB draft to reach the top level as fast as the best guys in the NHL draft. 

But with the advent of analytics and more access to players through video, pre-draft workouts and camps, drafting not only in the 1st round but throughout the draft is getting better.  

I think the numbers bear out that, in 2024, we have reached a point where high draft picks should be a sure thing, IF THOSE PICKS ARE THE RIGHT ONES.  

Have #1 overall picks failed in the MLB draft?  Sure.  Stuff happens.  But looking per decade, there has been a marked increase in hitting on the #1 overall pick in the last 15 years.

2010s - 20% failures (best case, some guys on the fence may not develop)

2000s - 50% failures

1990s - 30% failures

1980s - 10% failures

1970s - 50% failures

1960s - 50% failures (only 5 drafts)

What caused this?  I think it is analytics.  The only consideration relative to analytics is when teams distort the meaning and go in a direction that is contrary to the normal consensus of what analytics should provide.  In some cases that works out.  For example, the Guardians 2021 draft has a chance to be its best of all time because they spend almost every pick on college pitchers and, using analytics, picked the right pitchers who, within the Guardians development system, stood a good chance of being developed into ML contributors.  In 2022 and 2023, however, the Guardians eskewed the prevailing trend and drafted a lot of LH slap hitters, a strategy that has not worked for them, SO FAR.  There is a real chance that from those 2 drafts they may only end up with ONE ML player, Chase DeLauter.  That would be a disaster that I hope they can overcome with their unbelievable fortune of getting the #1 overall pick in the 2024 draft.

Analytics, I think, also has improved the early round drafting of HS position players.  Jackson Holliday is the most recent example although the counterpoint to him is Druw Jones, who was 1A to Holliday in pre-draft rankings but has struggled with EXACTLY what analytics suggested his weakness would be: his hit tool.

Look, any time it takes 4-6 years to develop a player, things can happen that result in that player failing.  However, drafting at the top of the 1st round should give the Guardians a great player.  The only thing that could kill that is if they think they know more than anyone else in baseball and draft a lower rated player or a player with obvious warts like they have in the last 2 drafts.  This fear does make me kind of sick to my stomach as this opportunity is (and should be) a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity for Cleveland.  They need to make the most of it.  Scratching the surface on draft history says they are set up to get a great player and maybe, due to drafting 10th in each round and having a Comp A pick this year, getting one of their strongest drafts ever. 

Let's hope so.  This organization desperately needs it, after 2022 and 2023.

The Off-Season So Far - Lots to Unpack

 This team had easily identifiable needs entering the off-season:

• Get all their starting pitching healthy.  All but one of their top 6 starters entering the off-season had missed time with injury in 2023, three of them significant time and two of them, time at the end of the year meaning that we really have no idea how serious their injuries really were as, in-season, they only lasted a few weeks. 

• Get two starting OFers, CF and RF, preferably switch hitters or RH hitters to balance the lineup

• Get a backup catcher, preferably one who could hit AND play defense, to replace the hapless Cam Gallagher

• Get someone to replace the failed Josh Bell at DH, preferably one with the flexibility to play a position of need so DH could be used, at least part-time, as a way to rest your veterans, especially Ramirez & Naylor, while keeping their bats in the lineup.

• Solidify your bullpen, either with internal options or externally, adding one backend bullpen guy to take the pressure off of and insurance for Stephan, Karinchak and/or Clase continuing their downward slides.

That was a significant to-do list but not insurmountable, even for a team of limited resources like the Guardians.  In fact, some would say that all the pieces were already in the system, just waiting for an extended chance to succeed.  And everything else (who would be the SS, who would be the backup OFers and IFers, what would be the ordering, in next-man-up terms, of the backup starters) would be decided in ST from a plethora of applicants.  Ah, depth and competition! Always a positive, IMO.

The problem is that the way the FO has approached trying to complete these off-seasons tasks has been confusing and, in many cases, contradictory.

So let the unpacking begin:

• Claimed Alfonso Rivas on waivers from Pittsburgh - The first move of the off-season was puzzling (see below for continuation of this theme).  We brought in a guy who failed on a 2nd division team and he was left-handed, first base/DH only guy.   We have Manzardo and Naylor at 1B.  They are both LH.  This was a very disappointing way to start the off-season, considering we had to pay a $50,000 waiver fee and he blocked us protecting one of our prospects in the Rule 5.  All's well that ends well, however, as the Angels picked him up on waivers when we did his inevitable DFA, cancelling out that waiver cost, and we lost no one in the ML Rule 5 draft.
• Claimed Christian Bethancourt off waivers and DFA'd Cam Gallagher.  On the surface this seems like a good move.  Compared to Gallagher, we improved both the offense and defense of our backup catcher position...and significantly. While Bethancourt cost more than backup catchers should ($2.3 million) it was not THAT outrageous an amount considering our need for a backup catcher who can hit. To the point that it even, at some level, threatened David Fry's position on the roster.  
• Sold Bethancourt to Miami and signed Austin Hedges for $4 million -People love Hedges.  The coaching staff love Hedges, the other players love Hedges, MLB loves Hedges.  He is the perfect backup catcher except for the fact that he can't hit a lick AND he cost the penny-pinching Guardians (see Barlow scenario below) $4 million, over twice what a backup catcher should cost.  We likely recouped a little more than the waiver fee for obtaining Bethancourt, with the cash transaction (probably like $100,000) with the Marlins but, aside from that, this was a big cash outlay for a backup catcher.
• Traded Cal Quantrill to Colorado for minor league catcher Kody Huff - This move was a salary dump and a strange one, considering that Quantrill was likely, in terms of talent, the 6th starter in a 5-man rotation.  Trading him was not so much the issue.  It was giving Quanterill away for nothing.  Huff is not a prospect and we all wondered why they would make this trade if they didn't really get anything of value back.  Why not just non-tender Quantrill?  And, in the current market, what was wrong with a $6 million starter, a price that was about 50% of what backend starters were going for in free agency?  We later found out with their next move...
• Traded Enyel De Los Santos to San Diego for Craig Barlow - The reason for the trade with Quantrill became came clear when Antonnetti said that Barlow and his $7 million salary would not have been attainable if they had not shed Quantrill's salary.  The impetus for this trade was to give the Guardians another quality arm at the backend of their bullpen.  Given the number of blown saves last year by their close, Clase, and their #1 setup man, Stephan, and the inability of anyone else still on the roster to step up into either of those roles, even on a temporary basis, the trade made sense IF we thought we were going to be competitive for the playoffs in 2024.  What didn't make sense is that the Guardians, all about player control, turned 3 years of control of De Los Santos and 2 years of control of Quantrill into 1 year of control of Barlow, presumably because the 2024 salaries balanced out.  
• Signed Ramon Laureano to a 1 yr, $5.1 million deal -  So, here is where this off-season REALLY started to get contradictory.  Laureano signed FOR MORE than he was projected to get in arbitration.  How could a financially-challenged organization like the Guardians afford this amount for a guy with Laureano's history that made him look like a career platoon player/4th outfielder, when they had to do a salary dump of Quantrill and trade De Los Santos to afford one year of Barlow?  The only way this made sense is if the Guardians think that Laureano is going to be a full-time or close to full-time player, likely replacing the offensively-challenged Straw in CF.  If they are thinking that he platoons with Brennan against LH pitching and serves as the 4th outfielder then they are paying over $5 million for playing, at the most 1/2 of the time (more likely 1/3).  Signing him to do that is THE OPPOSITE of what a team that had to dump two pitchers and 5 total years of reasonably-priced control for 1 year of a quality set-up guy so they didn't have to take on additional salary would be doing, right?
• Drafted 1B/3B Devison De Los Santos in the ML Rule 5 draft - He is an emerging power hitting prospect, something this farm system is short on, partly by design with their recent drafting of multiple LH slap hitters.  But in order to remain with the Guardians, our new De Los Santos has to stay on the roster this whole year. To be clear, this is a low-risk, throw it against the wall and see if something sticks move.  If we have to return him, so be it.  But this move did show one thing: we thought we needed to bring in more power hitters.
• Lost Oscar Gonzalez on waivers to NYY - This was a headscratcher.  This team needs power and Oscar has power.  He failed in 2023 but was it just that the league caught up to him and he couldn't respond or was it just a sophomore slump?  He has minor league options left and it wasn't like we needed his roster spot.  This team just showed they were bringing in power hitters  and they just Gonzalez go for nothing.
• Signed Ben Lively to a ML deal - Money-wise, who cares?  Lively will make the minimum.  The only reason this is a headscratcher is that Lively is the type of guy  who comes in on a minor league deal.  If the Guardians say they see something in him that everyone else in baseball didn't see then that is, to me, an issue.  You don't dump Oscar Gonzalez and, in the next breath, sign Ben Lively.  Both may be found to be AAAA players but Lively has already gotten there.
• Traded Cody Morris for Estevan Florial - To be clear, this was a minor trade.  It brought in a 26-yr old, 9-year (mostly in the minors) veteran CF candidate with power and speed but real contact issues who has no minor league options left and sent away a 27-year old ML reliever with an injury history that likely precludes him from being a starter but who has options left.  The puzzling things here are that we already brought in Deyvison who must be rostered and Florial also has to be rostered, we already signed Laureano to the type of contract that, in Cleveland, has to make him a starter, we have put a premium in the last two drafts on acquiring slap hitters, Florial is another LH hitter meanng him being a full-time starter would further unbalance the lineup and we already have Brennan and Straw and have DeLauter, Valera, Noel and JRod as options for the OF.  Hey, I am not, in theory, against Florial.  It's just that we have, earlier this off-season, gone down the path with Laureano that requires him to be a full-time player and dumped a potential powerhitter in Gonzalez. Then we bring in Florial who hasn't established himself as a ML player in 9 seasons and give away pitching depth that we need because we traded way Enyel De Los Santos and Quantrill. That is, to me, very contradictory.  

SUMMARY

So, in my opinion, we have made many head-scratching moves.  I envision Antonnetti sitting in his office in 4 months, smoking a cigar and saying, in his best George Peppard impersonation, "I love it when a plan comes together".    But, right now, all I see are a bunch of moves that don't fit together and look like this ship, rather than moving in a particular direction, is completely rudderless, moving in random directions that, in the end, lead us further away from being competitive.

Right now, it is like waiting for the other shoes to drop when your octopus has put down only one shoe.

Cody Morris gone. Nothing comes back.to Cleveland

Cody Morris is not one of the top 10 pitchers on our ML roster which will have 13 pitchers.

But he had a clear place on our roster in 2024

So, that's out of the way.  

Estevan Florial is not one of the 30 best, ML-ready players in Cleveland.

Estavan Florial is not more valuable than Oscar Gonzalez who we gave away on waivers.

All that being said, this was NOT a major trade.  But it is a TERRIBLE trade for the Guardians.  

Think what led to this trade today:

• Picking up Rivas on waivers when we had no slot for him in 2024 with Josh Naylor and Manzardo being ahead of him as LHH first basemen/DH guys.
• Signing a career mediocre OFer in Laureano to a $5.1 MM contract
• Waived Oscar Gonzalez
• Waived Rivas

Now we have traded a real asset for a LHH major league failure/AAAA player who we can't even send to the minors because he is out of options.

Our FO has been duped again.

They have made the 2024 roster and the roster going forward worse.  The only thing that would make this an even trade, and I am not wishing this on Morris, is if he had a career-ending injury and the Yankees would get the same big, fat ZERO that the Guardians will get out of this deal.

Once again, the FO thinks they can outsmart the entire league and, instead, are outsmarted again.  And our team is weaker going into 2024.

The Blockbuster Trade of All Blockbuster Trades

So, let me begin by saying that I am all about the statues.  I don't think we have enough of them in Cleveland.  I spent a lot of my adult life in St. Louis and anyone who has been to Busch Stadium knows this is a team that has statues, 12 of them, to be exact.  Statues of Stan Musial, Bob Gibson, Lou Brock, etc., with the 121 including representation from the Negro Leagues, coaching ranks and broadcaster ranks in addition to other star players.  Anyone who has been to that stadium and looked around before the game knows what a rallying point that is for fans and how it breeds baseball tradition in St. Louis.

With these things being said it is hard for me to talk about trading someone who has the chance to be revered above all other Cleveland baseball players, and spoken in the same breath as the immortal Bob Feller.  That player, of course, if Jose Ramirez who, if he stays healthy and productive, will own every important hitting record in Cleveland history and is a likely future member of the Baseball HOF.  

However, this post talks about trading him.  In fact, it talks about the Guardians trading:

• A future HOFer (Ramirez)
• A former Cy Young award winner (Bieber)
• The 2022 Gold Glove CFer (Straw)
• The 2023 Platinum Glove winner and 22/23 Gold Glove award winner (Gimene)

I know this will require Ramirez to waive his no-trade clause...and me to forget about any chance he would get that statue in Cleveland, unless he bounces around the rest of his career like Thome did, not staying in any one place long enough to wear another cap into the HOF.

I am actually proposing two trades:

We trade Ramrez, Bieber, Straw Gimenez to the Dodgers.

The Dodgers trade us: Bobby Miller, Emmett Sheehan, Michael Busch, James Outman, Max Muncy and Joendry Vargas.

Now, if we substituted Dalton Rushing and Justin Wrobleski for Muncy, we could be done there.  But my thought was to go for it, so I took the aging Muncy knowing he would have value to other teams and spun him.  So, if we do that, here is my second trade:

We trade Muncy, Sheehan (or Logan Allen) and Angel Martinez to the Cubs for Christopher Morel

Here are the reasons I think this would work:

Dodgers

• The Dodgers could use improved offense and defense at 3B and Ramirez is a perennial all-star and a recent Gold Glove finalist AND he is a favorite of Ohtani.
• The Dodgers could use offensive and defensive help at SS and putting Gimenez there to replace the aging Miguel Rojas will help
• Straw's bat is less of an issue with a lineup that has Betts, Freeman, Ohtani, Ramirez, Smith and others
• Beiber is an ace who, being a California boy, is likely very willing to sign long-term with LA.
• It will hurt to give up Miller and Outman but Busch has no clear position, Sheehan is already expendable and Muncy would be made expendable by this trade. Even saying this Miller and Outman are replaced in this trade by Bieber and Straw and Ramirez replaces Muncy.

Cleveland

• The Guardians get younger AND less expensive with this deal
• Miller joins Bibee and Williams as 3 bona fide future aces on one staff with control for the next 5 seasons, 2 of which are pre-arbitration seasons
• Trading Gimenez frees a spot for one of our MIF prospects so now could think about having all of Rocchio, Arias and Freeman on the roster
• Likely Muncy replaces Ramirez unless we trade him and then Busch replaces Ramirez.  He is then backed up by Freeman or maybe Brito with Rocchio or Arias sliding over to 3rd.
• Sheehan slots in as our 5th starter if McKenzie isn't ready to go during ST or as trade bait (for Morel) if we think we are good with our current starters plus Miller.  Or, he could be the first man up from AAA if we want to stash him there for insurance.  He could always use a little extra work with our pitching development people.
• Joendry Vargas is the wildcard in this deal.  Even if everything else in this deal falls apart for the Guardians, Vargas should be in Cleveland for long after the entire rest of our haul reaches free agency.  It may take several years but, in this case, that is a great thing for Cleveland

So, if this is all we did, this would be a great Cleveland trade where you turn veterans into prospects and extend the window of contention where, instead of skipping 2024, we might now be competitive in our division in 2024.

But if we add the trade with the Cubs, we get even better.  Here are the reasons I think the Cubs deal makes sense for both teams:

Cubs

• In my opinion, Morel's trade value will never be higher.  I see him as defensively challenged at any position whose best position is DH, a position he was used at most frequently in Chicago in 2023.  The longer he plays defense, the more exposed he is and he is pushing up against that DH glass ceiling.
• Muncy replaces Morel's production and he is under contract for 2 more years at a reasonable cost, plus he can play 3B and 1B effectively.
• The inclusion of a young, controllable ML SP in Sheehan or Logan Allen takes a lot of the sting away from the loss of a controllable power hitter like Morel
• The inclusion of Martinez gives the Cubs a very good prospect they can fall back on if the careers of Muncy and Sheehan or Allen go south.

Cleveland

• This deal makes sense for Cleveland as it completes the restructuring of their lineup to give them more power.  
• Without Ramirez in the lineup the DH position can become a stable one where you don't have to give Jose more days off from fielding as his career goes on while keeping his bat in the lineup
• Cleveland has to gamble that they are in a good position to only have 5 starting pitchers ready but any Bieber trade that doesn't bring back a young, controllable, ML starting pitcher was going to do that.
• The loss of Martinez is significant but does clear at least a little of the AAA MIF logjam of Brito,  Tena and Martinez
• We position ourselves for adding payroll at the trade deadline and still having one of the youngest, cheapest rosters in the majors. where now EVERY player in that lineup has the potential to be an all-star except, of course, in the Bermuda triangle that has formed in RF.
• With the cheap roster we could use money to sign Josh Naylor to an extension.  He is the glue that holds this thing in place and we need him here, especially if we are giving up Ramirez.

SUMMARY

After these trades here is our likely lineup (not batting order) for 2024

LF - Kwan

CF - Outman

RF - JRod

3B - Busch

SS - Arias

2B - Rocchio

1B - Josh Naylor

C - Bo Naylor

DH - Morel

UIFer - Freeman

Utility - Fry

Backup C - Hedges

Backup OF -Laureano or Brennan (loser, likely Brennan, goes to AAA)

For the rest of our 40 man here is what it does

•  Manzardo, Brito and Tena get more of a chance to develop and gain positional versatility
• We create a situation where our next men up in terms of position players are really close to league-best in both talent, control and star power.
• We put ourselves in great position to trade at the deadline or next off-season once we sort out which prospects, including guys like Valera, Noel and DeLauter in addition to Manzardo, Brito and Tena that we don't need.
• We open, with these two trades, a net 2 spots on our roster to have flexibility to bring up Manzardo or any minor league signee we need to at or near the start of the season without having to DFA anyone.

Mega-trades like this are almost unheard of in basebal history but this makes sense for the Dodgers and Cleveland and allows the Cubs to hedge their bets on competing now or pivoting to competing in 2025.  

So that's it.  Let 2024 begin!

How Do We Fix The Salary Mess?

 I read a tweet the other day that posted the total salaries teams will have in 2024.  Of course, the numbers were wrong because it doesn't factor in arbitration agreements/settlements that will happen.  The list has Cleveland at $73 million but, unless someone is traded, their 2024 opening day 40 man will be closer to $90 million.

But the tweet brings up the typical old argument: Baseball owners are interested in keeping profits, are cheap and won't spend money on their teams.  The  tweet suggested a floor of $100 million for team salaries every year.  

But that is an idea that won't work.  Here's why:

• There will be 780 guys on ML opening day rosters, not counting guys on the IL.  
• Those 780 guys have agreed to play for the salary they were promised.  Thus, obviously, there is enough money to pay for those players.  Few, in any, of them are 'holding out' for larger salaries. 
• On the point of holdouts, likely, these 780 will represent >95% of the best available players, not counting rookies who may be inherently better but wouldn't move the needle in terms of team salaries if they were substituted for guys already on 26 man rosters.
• Here is the speculative but logical part of the argument:  the other 5%, the ones who don't sign, are at or near the bottom of the quality pool for veterans.  Very few, if any, of those 5% are there because they refuse to play unless they get paid more money.  Most are there because there are better, cheaper internal or external options for that job and those guys have to accept minor league deals because there is just no place for them.  Remember, with what MLers are paid and the benefits and the pensions they get just for being in the majors, it is worth it to stay in the minors looking to get promoted.

If you believe these arguments then there are only three scenarios if you have a salary floor for ML baseball teams:

• Lesser players will make more money because teams will have to reach that $100 million threshold
• Teams will bid on higher-priced free agents, driving up the salaries of the best players once they get to free agency but, likely, not changing where those free agents end up.
• Teams will take on or retain bad contracts of players just to reach that $100 million floor.

So, given the above, the salary floor could do basically three things: 

• make inferior players get artificially high salaries, 
• make the top tier players get even higher salaries than they do now. 
• maybe, and I repeat MAYBE, cause teams to favor second tier veterans over rookies.

 Neither the weaker veterans getting paid more or the best players getting paid more will change the competitive balance in baseball.  I mean, do you really think if Oakland filled their roster with Ramon Laureano/Jaime Barria etc. types it will make them win more.  If the A's took on Marco Gonzalez's salary would it make them more competitive?  No, it would simply make the A's spend more money for the same, non-playoff outcome.

There is only ONE positive thing I think we would get from a salary floor: teams would be more likely to meet that floor by doing a Jackson Chourio/Wander Franco thing and signing their young, pre-arbitration players to long term contracts just to meet that salary floor.  Given what is going on with Franco, I don't see that as a logical pathway in most cases, especially not with pitchers (see Stephen Strasburg, for example).  But I acknowledge it would be a way to get to the $100 million floor.

You are now free to ask: "OK, Mr. Negative, how do we make owners spend money in a way that addresses the competitive imbalances that exist in baseball without imposing an artificial salary floor?"

Well, I'm glad you asked.  

SO, WHAT IS THE SOLUTION TO MAKING TEAMS SPEND MORE MONEY ON THEIR ROSTER? 

The simple answer is that there is no reasonable way to fix this problem immediately, given that most solutions would have to be negotiated between MLB and the MLBPA.  A potential solution to this problem that might be implementable right now is to incentivize/mandate the small market franchises into spending more money getting better amateur players into their system.  Here are a few things I think MLB could do right now to help make that happen.

Amateur Draft: 

THE CARROT

• Teams that did not make the playoffs would get an extra $5 million added to their draft budget.  Looking at the budgets for the 2023 draft, here is what those budgets would have looked like for the teams 10 picks in that draft.  The numbers I have included are the original budget/my proposed budget/my proposed budget plus 5% (the highest amount a team could spend before losing a draft pick the next year).  All numbers are in millions.

Pirates: $16.1/$21.1/$22.1

Tigers: $15.7/$20.7/$21.7

Nationals: $14.5/$19.5/$20.4

Twins: $14.3/$19.3/$20.25

Athletics: $14.2/$19.2/$20.1

Reds: $13.8/$18.8/$19.7

Mariners: $13.2/$18.2/19.1

Marlins: $12.8/$17.8/$18.6

Royals: $12.3/$17.3/$18.1

Rockies: $11.9/$16.9/$17.7

For comparison, it is likely that the Guardians would have $20/$25/$26.2 if my system was in place next year.  That is about $18 million more than they had this year, meaning they could take, and sign, more 'flyers', i.e., guys who normally would go to/back to college instead of signing.

• Teams that make the playoffs who receive revenue sharing get $1 million added to their next draft budget so that they are not left out and are rewarded for their success even though they are a small market team.

THE STICK

All the teams who receive extra draft budget monies have to spend their entire budget.  If they don't they lose their second draft pick the next year.  The penalty on any amount that they spend over their budget (up to 4.99%) is added to whatever their draft budget money is the next year.  In essence, the penalty they pay is just banked by MLB and given to them to spend on the draft the next year.  

International Signing Period

• All the teams in the top budget group for the international signing period will receive an additional $2 million in their budget above what they would be given in the current calculation system.  
• All the teams in the second group receive an extra $1 million over what the budget is calculated to be using the current calculation system. 
• To make the international process less of a free-for-all, no team is allowed to sign more that 10 players for more than $10,000.  There is no cap on the number of players a team can sign overall, however.
• Teams are fined at a 50% rate for any money left over that they do not spend on international signings.
• Like amateur draft signings, however, the bonuses of all players signed for over $10,000 are made public so that fans can see how much of their international budget teams are actually using.
• The date for the international draft is agreed upon before opening day 2024 with that draft starting in January, 2026. 
• Players who are 17 years old or younger when they sign get an extra year before they are eligible for the Rule 5 draft.

SUMMARY

These changes to the acquisition process for both drafted and international amateur players, along with the ability to protect amateur international signees from the Rule 5 for an extra year, should force teams to spend money on acquiring amateur talent.  While it is theoretically possible for teams not to invest more heavily in player development infrastructure, this is a business and you want to maximize your assets so teams would likely increase their player development budgets to support the extra talent they have coming in.  

Would this change the competitive balance immediately?  No, it would likely take 3-5 years to see the changes.  But when you take a look at teams like Baltimore, Cincinnati and Cleveland it is easy to see how you could compete under this system.  In fact, if the Guardians had not squandered Nolan Jones, Will Benson, Yandy Diaz, Junior Caminero and Yainer Diaz, among others, they would be the absolute poster child for the success of a system like this.

Large market teams would still get to invest in free agents and take on large contracts of veterans players from small market teams in exchange for prospects but the small market teams, if they do their jobs correctly, would be able to compete with younger players just like the Guardians did in 2022 and we hope they do in 2024.  

Punt on 2024 - Look Out 2025

Look,  2024, based on Cleveland's 2023-4 offseason, is turning into a mess:

• Long term plays:
• Draft DDLS in the Rule 5
• Trade Quantrill to open up a roster spot for a young guy
• Pick up Alfonso Rivas on waivers
• Trading Beiber???
• Short term plays
• Signing Laureano to a bloated 1 year deal
• Trading 5 years of control of Quantrill/De Los Santo for 1 year of Barlow
• Bringing back Hedges at $4 million
• DFAing Oscar Gonzalez to open a roster spot
• Signing Ben Lively to a ML deal as a depth starter
• Signing Adam Oller, Jamie Barria and others to minor league deals as depth options.

Some might call this trying to thread the needle but I call this chaos.  You can make the short term plays they did (Laureano, Barlow, Hedges, Lively) which looks like you are throwing money (haphazardly, IMO) at trying to win and then not REALLY do anything to win.  You can't build for the future if you are giving ABs (Straw/Laureano/Hedges) and IP (Lively/Barlow) to guys who are likely not part of that future.

So here is my thought:  Dump 2024 and shoot for being competitive in 2025.  Here is what that entails:

• Trade Beiber now ONLY if you can get a good deal.  My suggestion has changed thngs some.  What you need long-term is SP.  You no longer look for a RHH OF bat for Beiber, you look for a AA pitcher ready for AAA this season..  Otherwise, keep Beiber until the deadline or even all season (if you plan to make him a QO this winter)
• Keep Barlow until the deadline and then trade him.  You have likely screwed the pooch on trading him now so it might be best to package him with Beiber at the deadline to get a better return for 2025. 
• DFA Rivas.  He is not part of the future.
• While I would love to trade him, his salary makes Laureano untradeable.  So unless you can find a deal for him that looks good, keep him until the deadline.
• Dump Straw now for whatever you can get for him.  He simply is blocking too many guys from getting ABs as we try to sort out who will be on the 2025 roster.
• Find a way to keep DDLS on the 26 man roster even if it means sending someone to AAA for a bit. Not everyone has to be on the active roster on opening day.  In fact, that is not possible.  
• Have a plan and that plan has to get about 5 guys (Arias, Rocchio, JRod, Freeman, Brennan) 300 PA apiece to see what we have in them both as future assets but also as important trade pieces.  DDLS needs only minimal ABs.  
• We need to get Noel some ABs and work in Tena and Martinez where possible if injuries pop up.  If things go well, these guys either are in the mix for 2025 or are trade bat next off-season as we get controllable guys for 2025 or beyond.
• Quickly, and I mean QUICKLY pivot away from Arias if he is not good in April and May.  We need to look at other guys and Gabriel may need to go to Columbus to work on his game if he doesn't hit the ground running.  Rocchio, Freeman, Tena and Martinez are waiting for their auditions and Arias has, IMO, already had his 15 mintues.
• Leave Manzardo & Brito at AAA all season.  I know this will be an unpopular suggestion but if you are dumping 2024 as I suggest, these guys only need to get their feet wet at the end of the season, or even at the middle of the season, so that they maintain their rookie eligibility for 2025. 
• Promote DeLauter aggressively.  He should be playing at least half to year in AAA even if he struggles a bit in AA.  He SHOULD NOT be brought up to the majors this year as we don't want to roster him until he is absolutely ready or we have to in protecting him from the Rule 5
• When Espino comes back, work him out of the bullpen. 
• Make sure Dion, Cantillo and maybe Aleman get IP this year.  they all need to be rostered next off-season so we need to see what we have.

Simply put, we need to transition away from older guys and give experience to younger guys.  If we come into next off-season and guys like Rocchio.

If we are to compete in 2025 we need to identify our 26 man roster for 2025 by the end of the 2024 season and prepare to trade anyone who is not part of that plan.  But to get good value in those trades, you and the rest of baseball have to know the value of these guys. The 2023 treatment of Freeman shows you how a whole year can get away from you if you don't manage it proactively.

Friday Musings - Post- Draft Lottery Hangover and Rule 5 Results/Possible Insights Into Guardians' Thinking

THE HISTORIC LOTTERY

 Ahh, the essence of a lottery.  Long odds against you, prize at the end is (relatively) huge, no real expectations but an understanding up front that if you win it is a historic event and, potentially, franchise-altering, in a positive way.

The Guardians had such a historic windfall in winning the #1 overall selection in the 2024 draft, as I alluded to before, a Lebron year type windfall, that it has to be a positive.  Here are some of the positives:

• Our draft budget for 2024 just went up about $5 million. 
• The amount that we could go over our budget and not lose our 2025 1st round pick went up by $250,000 (5% of $5 million), which adds even more cash.
• Most teams go under the slot value significantly with these top picks.  It is not out of the question that the Guardians could sign their 1st rd. pick for under slot and save $500,000 for picks later in the draft AND sign the best available player at #1.  
• Having the 1st overall pick improves our ability to draft for need as there shouldn't be that much difference in ability of the first few players.  Normally a team should draft the best available player instead of the best available player that fills a gap in their system.  At #1 overall those two goals coalesce.  
• We shouldn't forget that having a competitive balance A pick and drafting 10th overall  in the rest of the draft ALSO add to the quality of our draft.  Last year we drafted 24th.  Imagine, in each round, having 14 more of the best available players in that round that you can choose from.   If you want an example, in 2023 if we had just picked ONE slot better we would have gotten a much better prospect in Colt Emerson.  If Atlanta, who picked one spot after us, had been one spot lower they might not have gotten Hurston Waldrep, who immediately turned into one of the top 100 prospects in baseball.  

Here are my other thoughts on this windfall:

• People who say Dolan is cheap and won't spend the money associated with this draft and having the #1 overall pick are likely way wrong.  History (the last 2 drafts, at least) tell me that the Guardians go OVER their draft budget, almost all the way to the last dollar over before they would lose a 1st round pick the following year.  So, folks, stop worrying.
• The Dolan haters who say that Dolan will just trade the pick to save money are wrong because this pick cannot be sold or traded.
• No one has suggested this but, for me, this draft windfall DOES raise the possibility that the Guardians may trade their Competitive Balance "A" pick, which is the 35th pick in the 2024 draft.  That WOULD be a cheap move unless it was used to get a great player in lieu of losing a good prospect in that same trade (bird in the hand worth more than ONE in the bush, so to speak)
• The other obvious negative outcome that might occur is that the Guardians could go way under slot with the 1st round pick to save money.  That might make some sense as this is supposed to be a weak draft.  They could then use the savings to draft and sign tough-to-sign top talents in later rounds who they normally couldn't afford.   Or, most negatively, they could just pocket some of all of that under slot savings.
• So, if you know me, you know there is one final elephant in my room.  In my opinion the last two drafts, outside of the apparently successful gamble on an injured, same-side-challenged, DeLauter, have been unmitigated disasters.  While injuries have hurt initial returns from these drafts, the problem with both is the concept: draft LH slap hitters with good strike zone control.  In almost every case they drafted for that desire, eschewing the best available players at that point.  And the results have simply been disastrous.  The prime example is drafting Ralphy Velasquez instead of the more obvious choice of Hurston Waldrep.  The latter is already a top 100 prospect and could well be in the majors with ATL in 2024. But there are many other examples: slap hitters Joe Lampe, Nate Furman, Guy Lipscomb in 2022 whose failures were likely not considered when doubling down with CJ Kayfus, Cooper Ingle, Christian Knapczyk, Tommy Hawke and Alex Mooney in 2023.  This, to me, is spitting in the face of baseball wisdom and of the struggles of the parent team as far as how lack of power hurt this team in 2023, to take a path no one else is taking.  This is a sign of the hubris of the FO and, especially, the amateur scouting department.

RULE 5 RESULTS

The Rule 5 came and went and here are my general observations and specific ones about the Guardians

General Thoughts

• The ML phase looked a little light this year, even though, in the days before the draft, there was only 1 team (Tampa Bay) who had a full 40-man roster and there were 13 teams with 3 or more openings on their 40-man roster.
• As usual, the draft focused heavily on pitchers as, of the 10 players selected, 8 were pitchers, with one SS/Util INF and one 1B/3B (Dreyvison De Los Santos) selected.  Pitchers, of course, have more flexibility as they can act as relievers or starters.  
• 4 of the 10 players selected were ranked in their team's top 30 prospects at the time of the Rule 5 with De Los Santos being the highest as Arizona's #5. 
• Four of the 8 pitchers selected were among the top ones available for this draft, according to the list provided by MLB.

Thoughts Related to the Guardians

• Although many informed prospect geeks among Guardians fans (me included) were hoping the Guardians went for a pitcher they did not.
• Instead, the Guardians drafted into a position of excess, 1B/3B where we already have Ramirez, Josh Naylor, Manzardo and the overflow from the MIF prospects, not to mention prospect Jhonkensy Noel and even the infamous AAAA player, Alfonso Rivas.  In addition, if the thought is to play De Los Santos at DH, that has been a position where the starters rest instead of taking a whole day off in addition to it being held for Manzardo when he is ready.  As far as his potential as a hitter, however, De Los Santos is top shelf in terms of his potential if we can find a way to keep him on the roster this year. More about him and how his presence would impact the 26 man roster this year in a later blog post.
• The Guardians did not lose anyone in the ML portion of the Rule 5 which is a good thing.  I think this was partially due to the lack of activity, in general, in the ML portion. Looking at who was selected, there was no way that any of the available Guardians prospects stacked up against the players who were selected in terms of current ability and the ability to stick on a 26-man roster next spring.  For example, Dayan Frias is a good prospect but Nazim Nunez is a much more polished version of Frias.  Ditto for Ethan Hankns & Lenny Torres, Jr. compared to the pitchers selected.  As I said before the draft, there was a wealth of available pitchers which helped the Guardians not lose anyone in the major league phase.  Catchers were not targeted which also aided the Guardians in keeping Bryan Lavastida.  
• Let's take a look at the players the Guardians gained and lost in the minor league phase:
• Gained:
• Tyler Brown - RHP - Relief pitcher who succeeded at AA and tasted a little AAA this year.  There is a lot to like in this kid and he stands an excellent chance to start the year in AAA, giving us another fringe relief prospect who could blossom and provide us injury replacement depth on the ML roster.  It sounds like his FB velocity took a bump up when he moved to the bullpen.  If our pitching gurus can help keep him on the step part of his learning curve, we might have a hidden gem in Brown.
• Connor Gillispie - RHP - Gillispie, like Brown, has completed his necessary work in dominating AA in 2023 so should have a place on the Columbus pitching staff in 2024.  He worked both as a starter and reliever in 2023.  I love his pitching line as, in 2023 he made 14 starts, 11 relief appearances, had 2 complete games, 1 shutout and 2 saves.  That is a pretty versatile stat line at a high level for a guy available in the minor league Rule 5.  I am really excited to see Gillispie pitch in 2024.
• John Doxaxis - LHP - Doxaxis is the typical minor league portion Rule 5 pickup. For example, Bradley Hanner, our MiLB R5 pick from last year was only mediocre in A+ ball in 2022 but blossomed in AA ball and held his own in the AFL in 2023.  Hanner is not a priority prospect for the Guardians but should move up to AAA in 2024, putting himself only 1 step from the majors.  Doxaxis will likely start 2024 in Akron and we will see if the Guardians' pitching doctors can fix what is wrong with his delivery and get the kind of result improvement they got from Hanner.  You can never have too many pitching prospects, especially LH pitching prospects.
• Lost
• Bryce Ball 1B - Ball looks like a professional baseball first baseman.   He is big, hits for some power and is good around the first base bag.  But he was picked up as a MiLB free agent during the season by Akron.  He might turn into a good MLB player given his physical and hitting tools but, as this point, he just seems like a career minor leaguer.
• Samuel Vazquez - RHP - Vazquez pitched in Lynchburg as a 23 year old in 2023.  He possesses a huge fastball, topping 100 mph.  He is the typical hard-throwing lottery ticket that a team hopes their pitching instructors can get consistency, control and command out of a guy who possesses a plus plus fastball like Vazquez does.  We may look back at this in years to come and kick ourselves over this loss but I am pretty confident that that won't be the case.  If it is, more power to the Nationals pitching development people.
• Thomas Ponticelli - RHP - Ponticelli was the typical innings eating Swiss army knife during his career with the Guardians.  He was like the minor league version of Josh Tomlin but his stuff just never put him over the top.  As an organizational guy at the top of a team's minor league chain he fills an important role and may, if things click, get some ML time in the future.  Still, looking at both Brown and Gillispie, I like their chances more than I like Ponticelli's so I am willing to accept the risk of a team unlocking Ponticelli's potential.
• Rule 5 Summary: I think the Guardians did well in the Rule 5.  They didn't lose anyone in the ML phase and gained a very interesting prospect with power potential, albeit at a position where we don't have a need.  In the minor league portion I think we got back more potential than we lost which is a good thing.

Columbus Reserve List

Something that is rarely mentioned is that the Rule 5 draft revolves around the players protected and not protected on a teams AAA reserve list.  The Guardians started the Rule 5 with 35 players on their AAA reserve list, as indicated by the announcer at the beginning of the minor league portion.  Although that list is not public, knowing which Rule 5 eligible players are on that list would be insightful to see who the organization thinks is their top Rule 5-eligible prospects are who they couldn't protect on their ML roster.  So here is my best guess.  Note that I have included all their minor league FA signings (all are eligible for the ML Rule 5) and the guys they actually picked in the minor league Rule 5 who all have to be added to the Columbus reserve list (thus the reason we only drafted 3 players).  Note that none of the 3 players we lost in the minor league phase were on the Columbus reserve list, obviously.  In the list below are guys that I guess are on this list but that I have no evidence for.

Pitchers (19): Barria, Bilious,Tyler Brown, Doxaxis, Enright, Connor Gillispie, Gose, Mikolajchak, Misiaszek, Oller, Scott, Burns,Torres, Jr., Hankins, Hanner, Jerson Ramirez, Wolf, LaBaut, Sabrowski, 

Catchers (4): Lavastida, Eric Rodriguez, Micael Ramirez, Nelson Aranguren

Infielders (10): Raynel Delgado, Pries, Schneeman, Bracho, Juan Benjamin, Christian Cairo, Maick Collado, Jose Devers, Dayan Frias

Outfielders (5):  Antunez, Burgos, Esteban Gonzalez, Alexfri Planez, Lexer Saduy

Again, a lot of this is speculation.  Some of these players are on the Columbus roster right now, some of them appear here because they were in the AFL (guess you wouldn't be sending someone to the AFL if they weren't at least going to be on your AAA reserve list) and some are just my guesses.  

Rant for a Saturday - Laureano? Quantrill? De Los Santos? Clase? Oscar Gonzalez? Bieber? Really?

 The off-season opened with the following moves:

• Claimed Alfonso Rivas from Pittsburgh for the $50,000 waiver price
• Signed Adam Oller (he of the 10+ ERA) to a minor league contract with a NRI.
• Claimed Christian Bethancourt off waivers from Tampa

The first two moves were headscratchers.  First, Rivas is a LHH 1B/DH type who has had no success in the major leagues.   Waiting until he was a free agent and signing him to a minor leage deal with an NRI to spring training is one thing.  Paying the $50,000 waiver fee for a redundant guy with no fit on this team is another.  Oller, as a NRI, is less puzzling except for his terrible stats and that we signed him so early.  Not to be lost in all this is that he is a former teammate of our new manager Steven Vogt.  The third move, for another Vogt acquaintance, Bethancourt was less puzzling, I guess.  Bethancourt will be a proven backup catcher with some pop.   The key for me is that Bethancourt would have had no internal competition in Tampa for the EXACT role he will play in Cleveland.  Yet Tampa waived him, presumably to save the $2.3 million arbitration salary he was likely due.   When I saw that Andrew Kizner was DFA'd by St. Louis instead of paying him the $2 million salary he was likely owed, it became clear to me that the market for backup catchers was going to be soft and that we will end up overpaying a little for Bethancourt's services.  That will be fine unless my pick for that roster spot, Bryan Lavastida is picked in the Rule 5 draft and has a good season with his new team while playing for the ML minimum (about $800,000, in his case).  While I still like Bethancourt more than Lavastida, I am not sure if it is $800,000 more.

OK, so that takes up the first 45 days of the off-season.  While these moves are just nuisance moves, this post is really about what happened from Nov. 15th on.  Let's go over them (and current rumors) and then discuss:

• Designated Cal Quantrill (with 2 years of control left) for assignment.  
• Traded Quantrill to Colorado for minor league catcher Kody Huff
• Traded Enyel De Los Santos (with 3 yrs of control) to San Diego for Scott Barlow (with 1 yr of control)
• Protected Daniel Espino and Cade Smith from the Rule 5 draft 
• Left Dayan Frias, Ethan Hankins, Lenny Torres, Jr., Brayan Lavastide, Daniel Schneeman, Aaron Bracho, Micah Pries, Nick Mikolajchak, Andrew Misiaszek and others unprotected from the Rule 5
• Designated Michael Kelly for assignment and lost him on waivers.
• Rewarded a mediocre performance by a platoon player, Laureano with a $5.1 MM contract which was well above the $4.6 MM he would have earned in arbitration
• Lost Oscar Gonzalez on waivers to the Yankees
• Signed RH SP Jaimie Barria to a minor league contract with a NRI to ST.

In addition, now we have a couple of pretty significant rumors:

• The Guardians are open to trading Shane Beiber
• The Guardians are open to trading Emmanuel Clase

Adding all this together:

• They de facto traded two players (Quantrill and De Los Santos) with 5 years of control for Barlow, with one year of control, effectively making our rotation weaker while only making our bullpen marginally stronger...and didn't even save any money doing it.
• They DFA'd Gonzalez even though, if they needed a roster spot, they could have DFA'd the very expendable Rivas.
• They are considering trading Clase (4 years of control) without an internal solution at closer
• They are considering trading Beiber without an internal solution for his roster slot.

None of these moves made in the off-season are logical and the only rationale I can think of is that the FO thinks they are smarter than all of baseball.

• They think that Quantrill is worth less than $6 million although the going rate in free agency for a SP like him is $12-13 million
• They think one year of Barlow is worth more than 5 combined years of Quantrill and De Los Santos
• They knew more than anyone else and overpaid Laureano when we have a number of young players who could have taken his ABs in the outfield, using up valuable resources for a cash-poor organization because they think journeyman Laureano is more special than he has shown in 5 years in the big leagues so far.
• They think that Rivas is worth more than Gonzalez and has earned a shot at making the team next spring although nothing in his history would show that he will do that 
• Like they did with Jones and Benson, they have made a decision on Gonzalez too early that cannot wind up positively and could end up in disaster.
• Taking it one step further, they drafted, in 2023, a whole slew of LHH slap hitters even though, when they applied the same strategy in 2022, it was a dismal failure. 
• Finally, they have set the table for us to sell low on our middle infielders, overplaying the underperforming Arias and burying on the bench both Freeman and Rocchio, both of whom could be traded this off-season for peanuts as they have depressed their value so much no one will even consider them a significant part of a trade.

These guys think they are going to turn baseball on its ear and show their peers that they have a better way of acquiring, developing and using talent.  They are trying to show all of baseball how smart they are and, in so doing, are going to take all the fans down with them, leaving this franchise in ruins for 10 years to come.   If this path is followed it will likely result in the following:

• Josh Naylor will not sign an extension here and will be gone after next season
• Jose Ramirez will be gone after next year or the year after that as they will have likely had to go into total rebuild mode.
• The best years of Tanner Bibee and Gavin Williams will be wasted in this rebuild as will any production they get from Manzardo, DeLauter and any of our MIF prospects we sell low on.

Maybe it will all be clear to me in the future on how this is going to work.  But this FO has given away so much talent and are doing stupid things that there is no way for this franchise to come out the other side stronger than it was at the end of the 2022 season.  

I am a Guardians fan for life. 

But I want this FO to stop doing stupid, unexplainable things that are stripping the heart and soul out of this organization just because they think they are so smart.  We don't deserve the world as a small market team.  But we deserve more than these idiots are giving us.

FO, please get your stuff together.  You are KILLING this franchise.  Just DESTROYING it.