Why We Need To Do Away With the Rule 5 Draft

 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

One of the proposals made by the MLBPA as the continuation of the Rule R5 draft.  I am not sure how serious the players are about keeping that draft or if it is just a negotiating ploy to create a throwaway item that they are readily willing to trade for something they really want.

But, whether or not the MLBPA really wants to keep the R5, this article provides data showing that the R5 draft should be discontinued as it is largely ineffective at its stated goal.

The article looks at demographics and statistics for players drafted in ML Rule 5 drafts from 2015-2024 and in the one year, 2021, when no ML Rule 5 draft occurred.  It also looks at the 2025 roster freeze to see who teams protected or did not protect in anticipation of the upcoming R5 draft.  The minor league phase of the R5 will not be considered in this article as there appears to be no evidence that the status quo for that phase will negatively impact future competitive balance or player opportunities to make major leagues.

My research showed that, while the ML R5 draft is one method to give some players a chance at playing in the ML before they would through normal development:

• The ML R5 draft was only slightly more effective at giving players the opportunity to play in the majors and become successful than if those players had just stayed with their original team.
• The R5 draft caused a number of players to have to play in the ML after having not played much, if at all, at levels above AA.  
• The threat of potentially losing prospects to the Rule 5 has caused teams to roster players who are too early in their careers to be effective major leagues. This resulted in needlessly using up some or all of their minor league options before they are ready for the majors. 
• In the one year, 2021, where no ML R5 draft was held, a number of prospects who likely would have been drafted wound up having ML success the next year (2022) and beyond with their organizations.
• If we exclude a few players who had good careers after being drafted in the ML R5, many R5 draftees, even if they had long careers in the majors, were mostly used in low leverage situations (e.g., middle relievers, backup position players/role players)
• R5 draftees often have very limited playing time in the season following when they are drafted. While a good number do get reasonable reps in their first year, the impression still exists that many are simply being stashed on the ML roster for the requisite one year (actually 90 days on the active roster)
• Rostering of players not ready for the major leagues to protect them from the R5 draft creates 'dead spots' on the 40-man roster being taken for years by players who weren't ready to help the ML team.  This limits a team's roster flexibility and causes more experienced players to be DFA'd (or not signed at all) to make room for these young, not-ready-for-MLB prospects on the 40-man roster.
• The R5 draft, in its current form, does little to redistribute talent from the richer teams to resource-limited teams. Instead, it mostly just shuffles prospects between the middle and bottom teams in baseball.
• In summary, the ML R5 draft takes up a lot of resources from teams trying to prepare for that draft.  At the same time, the ML R5 draft is not effective in improving the competitive balance in baseball and does very little to get players chances at playing meaningful roles in the majors. It also doesn't appear to give players chances that they wouldn't have if they had just stayed with the team they were R5 drafted from.  The ML R5 draft should be eliminated so teams can build their 40 man rosters to be more competitive each year and prospects can develop at a normal rate and not pushed to the major leagues by an artificial construct like the ML R5 draft.

BACKGROUND

The Rule 5 draft has, in some form, existed for over 125 years.  The intent, before the Rule 4 draft was instituted in 1965, was to prevent the wealthiest teams from hoarding talent by offering the largest bonuses to, essentially, buy up all the best amateur players.  Once a player was signed by a team, he was considered perpetually bound to that team as long as they continued to offer him even a minor league contract.  A number of rule changes have been made to try to stop this practice:

• The original Rule 5 - While this had many variations over the years, teams could draft players from other teams as a way to negate, to some extent, this hoarding. Many of the players attributed as successes in the Rule 5 draft (e.g., Roberto Clemente and George Bell) were actually obtained as part of the original first year player draft, where players could be drafted by other teams after they had played professionally for only one year.
• In 1965 the amateur draft was started with the goal of allowing all teams to have more equal access to amateur talent BEFORE they were signed by the wealthiest teams.
• In 1975 this 'reserve clause' was challenged and an arbiter made a ruling that abolished the reserve clause and established free agency. ML players could then become free agents after 6 full seasons in the majors.  
• Shortly after the reserve clause was invalidated, it was also established that players not on a team's 40-man roster could become minor league free agents after they had 6 full years in professional baseball.  
• Shortly after that, the rules were changed so that players on a team's 40 man roster could only be sent to the minors in three different seasons without having to pass through waivers before they could be sent down a 4th time. [NOTE: in some cases MLB grants a 4th option year to teams for certain players]
• Players who have been DFA'd one time can elect free agency if they are DFA'd a second time.
• Players with enough ML service time can elect free agency instead of being sent to the minors
• In 2022 the number of players a team can have in their US minor league system was limited to 165.

All these rule changes have, when considered together, addressed a lot of what the original Rule 5 was intended to address. Amateur players are now acquired more equitably and players are allowed to move from organization to organization more freely. 

So, the question becomes:

HAS THE MAJOR LEAGUE PORTION OF THE RULE 5 DRAFT OUTLIVED ITS USEFULNESS?

We have calls for a salary cap to keep well-financed teams from just buying championships.  We have calls for a salary floor to make the owners with limited resources spend more money to at least attempt to be competitive and/or keep their own players instead of trading them as they approach free agency.  Both these proposals, like the original intent of the Rule 5 draft, is to improve competitive balance.  

But is the Rule 5 draft, at the present time, really improving competitive balance?

[Note: All the data below comes from me counting up players.  Even though I checked my work, it is quite possible that I overcounted or undercounted by 1 or 2 in some of these categories.]

Looking at the 9 R5 drafts from 2015-2024 (there was no ML portion of the R5 draft in 2021) here is what I found:

• 130 players were drafted in the MLR5 draft.  59 were NOT returned to their original team while 71 were offered back
• The Yankees had the most (21) players drafted but only 4 of them were not returned. The team with the 2nd most players drafted was Cleveland (9), followed by Tampa Bay and the Dodgers (8). Baltimore (12) and Philadelphia (9) drafted the most players.
• 23 of 30 teams had at least 1 player who was drafted and NOT returned, 28 teams (not LAD or NYY) selected at least 1 player with 25 teams selecting at least 2 or more in this period.
• No team had more than 4 players that were lost for good in this period.

These numbers clearly give the impression that, for the most part, teams were just re-arranging the deck chairs within the financial lower echelon of teams and that redistribution of talent to those teams from well-financed teams was not effective.

Let's look at some more numbers from the R5 drafts during this period:

• Of the 71 players who were returned to their original teams
• 29 returned players (41%) NEVER played in the majors
• 8 returned players only played briefly for the major league team that drafted them. Once they were returned, they never played in the majors again.
• 13 of the remaining returned 34 players (38%) made their major league debut with their original team the season after they were drafted in the ML R5 and a total of 25 (74%) made their ML debuts in the first 2 seasons after they were drafted.
• 9 of those 34 players (26%) returned who played in the majors after they were returned have had major league careers of 5 years or longer, 21 (62%) have had ML careers of 2 years or longer so far.
• Of the 59 players who were NOT returned to their original team
• As said above, 59 of 130 (45%) of R5 drafted players were not returned to the team they were drafted from and, therefore, most made their ML debut the season after they were R5 drafted.
• 21 (35%) have had ML careers of 5 years or longer and 38 (59%) have had ML careers of at least 2 years so far.
• 32 of the 59 (54%) players not returned have had ML careers as mostly middle relievers, 5 have been leverage relievers and 6 are starting pitchers. The remaining 16 are position players.  Aside from the SP and leverage relievers, most of the 59 players not returned have had careers as low leverage players.
• Notable players from these drafts include
• Players returned to their original team : Nester Cortez Jr., Trevor Megill, Will Vest
• Players who were not returned: Anthony Santander, Brad Keller, Shane Smith, Mitch Spence, Liam Hicks, Garrett Whitlock and Jordan Romano.
• Therefore, over these 9 drafts there was, on average, one player per year who had a career as a high leverage player and 70% of those were players who were R5 drafted and not returned.
• The highest playing level a drafted player had obtained (using MLB's rookie definitions as a rough guide) at the time they were drafted were:
• AAA: not returned to their original team (19), returned (21)
• AA: not returned (26), returned (32)
• A+ : not returned (8), returned (10)
• A: not returned (3), returned (6)
• Rookie ball: not returned (1),  returned (1)
• Previous MLB experience: not returned (2), returned (1)
• Using the numbers above, players drafted in these R5 drafts were mostly at AA or lower in their development at the time they were drafted.
• 40 AAA
• 58 AA
• 18 A+
• 9 A
• 3 Rookie League
• The 59 players taken in these rule 5 drafts who were not returned filled the following roles in the ML careers:
• Middle reliever (32)
• Starting pitcher (6)
• Leverage reliever (5)
• Position player (usually platoon or backup) (16)
• Major league average for players making their ML debuts is 24-25 years old and the number of times players had to be sent to the minors after their debut before they stuck in the majors is twice.
• Players not returned averaged 2.2 times returning to the minors before they stuck in the majors
• Players returned and not returned both had an average age of about 24.5 years old at the time they made their ML debuts.

Looking at these second set of numbers gives the following impressions:

• Players who were returned to their original team actually had similar chances to make the ML, even in the year after they were drafted in the ML R5 draft to R5 draftees who were not returned.
• 88 of 130 (67%) drafted likely were not ready for the major leagues when they were drafted in the R5.as they had spent most or all of their careers up to that point in AA or lower levels.
• While players who were not returned generally had good major league careers, a number of players who WERE returned had good major league careers, as well.  This is even more compelling as you would guess that the players who were NOT returned had, by definition, a much greater likelihood of having good careers as they were likely more talented and ML ready than the players who were returned. 
• Finally, given the rules behind the Rule 5 draft, it appears the data supports that teams drafting players in the ML R5 are looking for players they can put in low leverage situations (e.g., middle relievers) in their first year with the idea that those players might develop into more later.  The data, however, doesn't support that to be true.

WHAT IS THE TRUTH ABOUT RULE 5 DRAFTEES BECOMING ALL-STARS?

Various sources list up to 41 players drafted in the Rule 5 draft who became all-stars since the early 1960s. As it turns out, after looking at this closely:

• 17 players drafted in the ML portion of the R5 and not returned fit today's criteria for what a ML R5 draft pick looks like and who also became an all-star.
• 10 became all-stars AFTER being returned 
• Of those 17, three (Jeff Nelson, Willie Hernandez and Ryan Pressly) became all-stars 8-10 years after they were drafted in the ML portion of the R5
• 3 (George Bell, Paul Blair, Dave May) were drafted in the R5 when you could be drafted after playing as little as one year of professional baseball and May and Blair, in particular, were really not Rule 5 draft picks at all, rather being part of a different draft of players with one year of professional experience. [NOTE: Other supposed ML R5 success stories like Roberto Clemente were not actually R5 draft picks, either. Clemente was drafted to Pittsburgh after only one year of minor league baseball]
• One additional player (Jason Grilli) became an all-star after playing for 3 ML teams before he was drafted in the R5
• An additional five Rule 5 draftees became all-stars after being selected in the minor league portion of the R5 draft
• One of the 17 (Derrick Turnbow) appeared to have required 4 minor league options before he established himself in the big leagues and became an all-star
• One of the 17, Josh Hamilton, was not even playing baseball when he was selected in the Rule 5 draft and turned his career around to become an all-star

In summary, the data above suggest the following

• It is slightly more likely (17 to 10) that ML R5 draftees who are not returned become all-stars compared to those who are returned after the R5 draft.
• There were a number of players, e.g., George Bell, who are portrayed as R5 success stories when, in fact, their entry into the R5 did not even fit today's criteria for being R5-eligible, making these lists of R5 success studies questionable.
• The number of all-stars (5) who came out of the minor league phase of the R5 adds support to keeping this phase going in the future.
• The number of ML R5 draftees who became all-stars, when each example is looked at closely, implies that these cases are more anecdotal than a trend and, therefore, do not support continuation of the ML R5 draft.

ARE PLAYERS SELECTED IN THE ML R5 LIKELY TO JUST BE STASHED ON A ML ROSTER FOR A SEASON SO THEY DON'T HAVE TO BE RETURNED TO THEIR ORIGINAL TEAM?

Looking at the 59 players who were not returned, here is the usage data for those players in their first year after being selected in the ML R5 draft. 

If a player met or surpassed the usage limits below in their first year they were considered to be used appropriately and not just stashed on the ML roster to fulfill the R5 requirement.

Relief pitchers: 35 games

Starting pitchers/swingmen: 70 innings

Position players: 300 plate appearances

The number of players for each type who met these criteria

POSITION PLAYERS: 4 met the PA criteria, 13 did not and so were considered 'stashed'

STARTING PITCHERS/SWINGMAN: 6 met the criteria, 0 did not

RELIEF PITCHERS: 18 met the criteria, 9 did not

INJURED LIST - 7 could not complete requirements

From the data above it can be concluded that most (73%) of pitchers drafted in the ML R5 draft from 2015-2024 were used enough in their first year to not be considered just stashed on the major league roster so they wouldn't have to be returned. On the other hand, only a few (24%) of position players played regularly enough to NOT be considered 'stashed' on the major league roster.

It does appear that most of the pitchers drafted in these ML R5 drafts did pitch enough in their first year to NOT delay their development.  However, it does appear that many of the position players were, met the criteria for low usage and, therefore, being stashed on the ML bench for their first year, likely delaying their development as baseball players.  Thus, the overall impression is that some of the ML R5 draftees are stashed on ML rosters although many are NOT stashed, using my definition.  As a proviso, this is not to say that these players had increased roles in their 2nd year after being drafted in the ML R5 draft, but at least a lot did not have their development terribly hampered by just sitting on the bench in their first year. 

WHICH PROSPECTS DO TEAMS TEND TO PROTECT FROM THE RULE 5?

It would have taken more time than I could devote to this project to look back for 10 years at which R5-eligible prospects teams chose to protect.  So I just looked at what the demographics were for the prospects teams chose to (and not to) protect against the upcoming 2025 ML R5 draft. Looking at the MLB article on which TOP prospects each organization protected (or did not protect) from the 2025 ML R5 draft by their roster additions this November, the highest level these players achieved (using MLB's rookie eligibility rules to establish if a player has had enough experience at the top level they had played in to have been able to graduate from that level), coming out of the November 2025 roster freeze was:

• AAA: Protected (40), not protected (20)
• AA: Protected (37), not protected (36)
• A+ : Protected (6), not protected (21)
• A: Protected (1), not protected (3)

Looking at these numbers, teams in 2025 seemed to prioritize protecting players who were close to ML-ready, with emphasis on players with significant AAA experience. Although players with less upper level experience may have been better prospects, teams seemed to be gambling that those less experienced players would not be drafted and, if drafted, would not be able to stick with a ML team.

ANECDOTALS

In my research and listening to people argue for and against the ML R5 draft over the years, I have encountered (or propagated) the following anecdotals regarding the ML R5:

• The ML R5 draft gives players who might not be developing in a system a chance to move to another system where they CAN develop. [NOTE: I have seen no evidence of that in my research and, even if it did occur, it would be very anecdotal]
• Teams dedicate a lot of time and money analyzing their prospects, analyzing other teams' trends in the Rule 5 and analyzing players available in the Rule 5 after the roster freeze is announced. [NOTE: While this is another one of those things that appears obvious, I have found no evidence that this is true.  I will say this, though. For small market teams that are resource -challenged, they could probably find a better way to use their analytics and team resources if they didn't have to worry about the ML R5 draft.] 
• Fear of the R5 draft causes teams to protect players earlier than they should, just to avoid the risk of losing a prospect.  [NOTE: While there is anecdotal evidence of that (e.g., Jhonkensy Noel protected by Cleveland when he barely had played in A+ and Juan Brito being protected when he had just completed a season of A ball) I did not see any evidence that teams routinely protect large numbers of A+ or A players (or lower) against the R5.  It does happen, but it does not appear to be common.]
• The ML R5 gives players a chance to get to the major leagues quicker than they normally would.  [NOTE: My research has shown this may be a fallacy created just because it is impossible to look at an alternate future where a player stays with their organization instead of being drafted. I will acknowledge that this is possible but, to me, is unimportant as the issues the ML R5 creates for players AND teams greatly outweigh the benefits for these few players, if they exist, which I could not prove through my research AND because there is ample evidence that a good percentage of returned players make it to the majors with the organization they were drafted from either that season or the next one.]
• We need a R5 draft because, without it, there is a chance that a player could be held by a team for 9 years (6 as a minor leaguer and 3 option years if he is rostered near the end of his first 6 years).  [NOTE: I acknowledge that is a possibility, but I think it is probably just theoretically possible or, at best, very anecdotal.  Again, exceptions cannot drive the continuation of the ML R5 draft.] 
• Players are emotionally scarred if they don't make it to the make it to the majors as a ML R5 draftee. [NOTE: I have anecdotal evidence that this is true from interviewing players who have been ML R5 draftees but, to my knowledge, no studies have been done to show that this is true.]
• Players not returned suffer developmental delays in their baseball career as a result of being 'stashed' on a big league roster (and bench) for a season, seldomly playing. [NOTE: Another example of something that appears to be obvious.  My research did show that many of these players were sent back to the minors (sometimes the low minors) the season following their ML R5 draft season, staying in the minors, sometimes, for a number of seasons before they returned to the major leagues for good. However, my research failed to show that this stashing occurred frequently nor was it necessarily a factor in delaying their development.  Rather, players who are returned to their original team don't appear to develop any faster or turn into better players than those who are NOT returned and are seldomly used in their first ML season.]

THE ML R5 DRAFT THAT NEVER HAPPENED

In 2021, teams set their ML rosters and their AAA reserve lists as usual, but the ML R5 draft never happened that year due, in part, to the lockout as the new CBA was still being negotiated.  This gave a unique chance for study of what would happen if the ML R5 draft was abolished and prospects who might have otherwise been drafted just stuck with their original team until they were rostered or just became 6 year minor league free agents..  That is, a lot of the proponents of the ML R5 draft point to the all-stars, MVPs and HOFers that have come out of this draft without considering whether those players would have achieved the same status if they had just staying with the organization that had spent years and lots of money to sign and develop them.

So let's take a look at some of the significant players who would have been available for the 2021 ML R5 draft and what happened to them in 2022 and in 2023-2025.  I will admit that, at this point, I am worn down from the research that I have done for this article.  I also acknowledge that I was not able to find, for 2021, an article like I found for 2025 that listed all the top prospects for each team that were or were not protected against the ML R5.  So the list I am about to give you is absolutely anecdotal, but it's the best I could do at the moment;  So here is the list of significant prospects I have found who were not protected against the 2021 ML R5 draft that never happened [NOTE: list is in no particular order]::

1. Yainer Diaz

2. Oscar Gonzalez

3. Will Benson

4. Joey Cantillo

5. Cooper Hummel

6. Lenyn Sosa

7. Kody Clemens

8. Jordan Diaz

Obviously this is just a cursory look.  I am sure if I could see a list of the top prospects team chose NOT to protect in 2021 more names would jump out.  In addition, teams had their lists of players they would consider drafting that might be in addition to the list above.  Just by inspection, this looks like a pretty decent list of players who could have easily been lost had there been a ML R5 draft in 2021.  The takeaway for me from this list is that players succeed or fail, in many cases, irrespective of the organization they are in but, rather, based on how talented they are.  It supports the presumption that a number of the biggest success stories coming out of the ML R5 draft would have been successes if there had NOT been a ML R5 draft.  

In my opinion, this just adds to the overall data that supports that the ML R5 draft is not needed and, in fact, can actually hurt the teams it should be helping, the resource-limited teams.

Guardians Top 75 Prospects - Mid-Season/Pody-Deadline Edition

After thinking about it, I barely could come up with 75 prospects so I cut it off there.  Apologies to anyone who was looking for a top 100 here.

1. Ralphy Velasquez
2. Angel Genao

3. Jaison Chourio

4. Liam Peterson

5. Juniker Caceras

6. Robert Arias - The injury is a concern but I am soooo high on this guy.

7. Braylon Doughty

8. Cooper Ingle

9. Daniel Espino

10. Franco Aleman

11. Jace LaViolette

12. Dean Curley

13. Alfonsin Rosario

14. Welbyn Francisco

15. Svert Reinoso

16. Dauri Fernandez

17. Yorman Gomez

18. Aaron Walton

19. Andrew Walters

20. Tre Broussard

21. Justin Campbell

22. Franklin Gomez

23. Joey Oakie

24. Khalil Watson

25. Nolan Schubart

26. Lucas Moore

27. Khal Stephen

28. Ryan Cessarini

29. Kody Huff

30. George Valera\

31. Bennett Thompson

32. Luke Hill

33. Kade Lewis

34. Milan Tolentino

35. Jackson Humphries

36. Aaron Davenport

37. Gabriel Rodriguez

38. Savion Sims

39. Deiten LaChance

40 Luis De La Cruz

41. Jacob Zibin

42. Austin Peterson

43. Trenton Denholm

44. Michael Kennedy

45. Will Hynes 

46. Rorik Maltrud

47. Reiner Herrera

48. Heinz Brito

49. Jogly Garcia

50. Hiverson Lopez

51. Cam Sullivan

52. Chase Mobley

53. Magnus Ellerts 

54. Logun Clark 

55. Anthony Martinez 

56. Dayan Frias

57. Tommy Hawke

58. Alex Mooney

59. Luis Merejo

60. Jose Devers

61. Aiden Major

62. Caden Favors

63. Juan Benjamin

64. Esteban Gonzalez

65. Rafe Schlesinger

66. Ryan Prager

67. Johan Rodriguez

68. Yeiferth Castillo

69, Melkelis Hernandez

70. Maick Collado

71. Jose Pirela

72. Evelio Hernandez

73. Cam Schuelke

74. Rafeliz Lara

75. Alejandro Blasco

Final Draft Post of 2026 - The 'haul; and how much it cost compared to my shadow draft's cost

 OK, in 2025 I said how much I disliked the Guardians draft and actually lowered an already low grade when I saw how much they overpayed for the talent they got.

So now let's turn the page to 2026 which, in my opinion, set a new low for recent Cleveland drafts with the draft room repeating past mistakes, drafting exactly the wrong kinds of players, drafting ZERO quality college pitching prospects, trying to show, once again, that they are the smartest guys in the room and smarter than everyone else.  

Let's now see how the smartest guys in the room did in terms of paying for their poor draft in 2026.

1 - Hunter Dietz, LHP, Arnkansas ($4.0 MM)

2. Ryan Peterson, RHP, Sam Houston St. ($1.5 MM)

3. Nathan Taylor, RHP, Cincinnati (0.800 MM)

4. Cal Randall, RHP, UCLA (0.600 MM)

5. Eric Nachtheim RHP, McNeese St. (0.300 MM)

6. Cam Johnson, LHP, Oklahoma (0.350 MM)

7. Savion Sims, RHP, HS ($1.0 MM)

8. Chris Katz, 1B, Mercer (0.250 MM)

9. Gavin Van Kempen, RHP, East Carolina (0.200 MM)

10. Christian Coppola, RHP, St. Joseph's (0.195 MM)

11. Mark Quatrani, C, Notre Dame (Not drafted - could have offered him $0.26 - 0.5 K)

12. Grayson Fitzwater, 1B, VMI ($0.150 MM)

13. Judd Utemark UTIL Ole Miss (Not drafted)

The total for my shadow draft through round 10 - $9,195 MM)

Total budget for Cleveland's draft ($9.303 MM)

Thus I came in underbudget and with a little tougher negotiation I could have had $750 K left for an overslot signing or two in rounds 11-20.

If the Guardians don't sign Schmidt, their actual draft comes in with a CEILING of a "C" grade if they can fix Peterson and if Sims makes the majors. 

This is as close to a total failure of any draft in the last decade for the Guardians and not something a resource-limited team can have.  

The only plus for the organization is that Dolan was able to put $1.5 MM (international pool not spent) + $3.2 MM (the value he would have had to spend on pick #29 he traded, along with Matt Wilkinson for Bailey + $1.6 MM (the amount he doesn't have to pay since Schmidt didn't sign).  That's $6.3 MM he gets to keep in his pocket and that doesn't count the $813 K he would have had to spend if they had gone 5% over their draft budget.

Therefore, Dolan has avoided spending over $7 MM this year on prospects.  If that isn't cheap, I don't know what is.  

Good night and good luck.  See you next draft season and place my shadow draft in your 2026 time capsule.  I think, 5 years from now, you would be ecstatic with my haul from this draft compared to the minimal haul the Guardians actually got.

We Are Lucky

 This season, like, last year, has been a struggle.  But as we all wring our hands because the possibility exists that this season could quickly slip away from us, let's look at what we are lucky for.

1. We are lucky we are in one of the two weakest divisions in baseball.

Look, it's here or the AL West. These are the two divisions that we are capable of competing in to win a division title. 

2. We are lucky we are in the AL

There are more teams above .500 in the NL, which puts us firmly in a wildcard spot right now. If we were in the NL, we would be among a whole bunch of teams competing for the last wildcard spot, but on the outside looking in.

3. We are lucky that we have the easiest schedule in baseball the rest of the way.

Yeah, we are 13-15 since Jose, Angel and CDL went down in the same game but we are (kinda) surviving that and looking forward to getting those guys back.

4. We are lucky there are SOOOO many buyers and so few sellers at the deadline.

WTF you say?!?!  Yep, it would suck to be a buyer in a seller's market.  Hopefully that keeps us from doing something stupid, like pushing a lot of chips in trying to bring in veteran players for a stretch run with a work stoppage looming.

5. We are lucky that Jose and Angel are, hopefully, coming back soon.

We have been treading water but we need the help.  Now Jose will likely not have power when he comes back and I hope to heck he knows that and becomes a supercharged version of Kwan instead of trying to be Aaron Judge.  We need him to be PART of the solution, not THE solution.

6. We are luck that our rotation and bullpen has been mostly solid and healthy.

We need that to continue, but we have been lucky with this so far.

7. We are luck we have Carl Willis

He is the glue that holds this pitching staff together.

8. We are lucky we have Steven Vogt.

Could you imagine Vogt in New York where every failed move is blasted by every possible source?  Vogt plays the long game better than any manager I have ever seen.  People don't like that about him but I love it.  He gets that it is a marathon and, for the most part, askews trying to turn it into a sprint.  I thnk the players buy in and work within that, knowing the success we have had.

9. We are luck to have had, and hopefully will have, meaningful baseball to play all the time as Guardians' fans.

I almost can't remember the 70s and 80s anymore, at least the baseball part. While there are lean years sprinkled into our 21st century baseball experience, we don't have whole decades like we used to.

10. We are lucky to have lived through the golden age of Guardians' baseball, 

The 70s and 80s were not good baseball decades for Cleveland but, for the most part, we have only had bad years, instead of bad decades, sprinkled in with our good years.

There are lots of things to be unhappy about with this baseball team from the ownership down to the players but we are really lucky and I hope we remember that.

Have a great evening, a great week and a great rest of the baseball season.  Go Guardians!

How Would It Work If We Even Shortened the MLB Draft?

 With age comes perspective. or so I have been told.

I have been a draft geek for most of my life.  When I grew up Cleveland's baseball team was so bad that the two times of year I could get really excited about it was during the draft and during September callups when I would search for heroes that were going to save me from the bad and mediocre teams of my youth.

So it was disappointing to me when the draft went from an unlimited number of rounds (no mor Mike Piazzas) to 40 rounds and then, after COVID and the reduction in minor league teams, to 20 rounds (no more Cody Allens and Daniel Schneemans).

Ahh, but we are back to that perspective thing (no pun intended, based on the name of this blog). 

Watching the Guardians draft in these last few years it is clear to me that the draft could really be limited to 15 rounds and it wouldn't impact the ML roster...like ever.  This would especially be true if HS kids were eliminated from the draft pool.

So what would a draft of less than 20 rounds look like?

1.  I can't see the draft being less than 15 rounds.  There has to be some wiggle room in case you can't sign some of your early picks. 

2. Just in case owners are thinking they can save money on the draft by shortening it, let's make sure that doesn't happen:

    a. The 15-round draft would be completely slotted, with the last pick in the 15th round having a slot value of $150,000.  Same rules as apply now would apply if this change was implemented relative to not exceeding your bonus pool or your bonus pool plus 5% if you are OK with paying a penalty.

    b. There will be NO trading of draft picks before the 10th round and only the top 10 teams in terms of revenue could trade picks, whereas every team could accept picks in trade. Draft picks from the upcoming draft are the only ones that can be traded. Look, while free trading of draft picks might make the horsetrading in baseball more fun, the goal of this rule would be to keep teams from crippling themselves long term AND to eliminate yet another way for owners to be cheap because trading a draft pick means they don't have to spend money on SIGNING the guy they drafted at that pick.

    c. Unlike proposals that have been floated, teams could sign up to 5 NDFAs with the top value being $140,000.  Anything over this bonus would count against the draft pool bonus.

    d. Obviously there would be no HS kids drafted and players are eligible for the draft after completing their 2nd year in college. If a player doesn't go to college they would be eligible in the first draft 3 years (2 seasons) after they graduated from high school.

So, we have cut the draft down by 5 rounds to limit the need to fill out your draft with organizational players who have little chance to make the majors.  We have also raised the bonuses for players by extending the slotting down to the end of the 15th round.  Finally, we have added some intrigue by allowing limited trading of draft picks in a way that doesn't allow cheap teams to avoid drafting players just to save money.  

I think this is a good plan but, of course, this is collective bargaining where good plans go to die.

The Case for Eliminating HS Seniors from the MLB Amateur Draft

Recently, as part of their latest proposal, the owners want to eliminate HS kids from the pool of players eligible for the amateur draft.

Given the owners' stance on other topics related to the new CBA, I tried to imagine how this would help the greedy owners to hold onto their money.  

Then something strange happened.  I found myself agreeing with the owners on this one topic.

I think we should limit the MLB draft to college sophomores and higher.

The statistics are compelling.  Before I present those counting stats, a few words about my process.  

A. The first 5 rounds represent 'pure' drafting.  That is, due to the numbers of potential high impact prospects, few college senior signings designed to save money. So, for college kids I used the first five rounds of drafting because it gets messy after that as teams are drafting low cost college seniors whose draft slot is generally not representative of their talent just to save money for a drafteee (usually a HS kid) who will require and over slot bonus.

B. Looking at HS players drafted, I used the first 11 rounds.  HS flyer picks are spread throughout the draft but the better ones are usually in the bonus pool rounds (1-10) and in the 11th round.  After that, the HS kids that are picked are usually low level prospects or, especially with ranked HS kids, contingency picks in case a team has excess bonus money (above slot) that they budgeted but had a player turn down (FYI, they lose the SLOT value if the player doesn't sign but they can still spend the excess they have saved up in the first 10 rounds). So the first 11 rounds is probably a good cutoff of kids they actually intend to sign.

C. I used MLB Pipeline's top 250 rankings.

So , here are the stats:

Of the first 11 rounds (343 picks) only 64 pcks (19%) were used for HS kids.  Only 3/4 of those HS kids were top 250 ranked prospects. The 49 ranked HS kids drafted in the first 11 rounds represents only 50% of the HS kids ranked in MLB's top 250, with the other 50% of the HS kids not being drafted.  

Looking at just the first 5 rounds for college players, of the 123 who were selected in the first 164 picks (41 were HS kids), 108 (88%) were ranked in the MLB's top 250. As expected, after round 5, the number dipped significantly with about 20% of the college players selected in rounds 6-10 being ranked prospects with a large number being drafted, in part, because they would sign for underslot bonuses. 

So, 49 ranked HS kids (about 25% of ranked draftees in the first 10 rounds) are HS kids. So 75% of RANKED prospects drafted in the first 10 rounds are college kids.  

So, what can we glean from this data?  Only about 50% of ranked HS kids are deemed signable or, at least, signable for the bonus they say they want.  Put another way, half of the quality HS kids would rather go to college.  Looking at top prospects and excluding low bonus draftees, we still have 75% of draftees being college kids.

Also, it should be noted that one study showed that 98% of draftees in the first 10 rounds sign so the above numbers not only represent who is drafted but that ranked players usually sign if drafted in the first 10 rounds.  

So what the MLBPA says is, essentially, correct.  Looking at relevant drafted players, most of the draftees are college players.  In addition, 50% of the good HS prospects feel it is in their best interest to go to college, due to some combination of NIL money and the feeling they can develop and do better in the draft after college experience.  

My take on this data is that only a few players would be inconvenienced if we eliminated drafting HS kids entirely.  Also, and this is just my opinion, the vast majority of the HS seniors who are signing are doing it so they can grab the brass ring while it is there, not because they feel pro development is superior to developing their skills in college.

What is indisputable is that teams are spending a lot of money signing HS kids to overslot bonuses.

Additionally, it is very likely that the draft pool of quality prospects in each draft would be almost identical to what it is now, as a HS kid not drafted in 2027 would likely be a quality prospect in the 2029 or 2030 draft.

OK, so the above stats show that not drafting kids out of high school would impact a limited number of prospects, let's talk about the pros and cons of eliminating this group from the draft entirely.

Cons

1. Kids might get injured in college and lose their leverage to get signed

2. Kids might not want to go to college

3. Kids might not get the development in college that they would get as professional players

4. Development would be turned over to the colleges and we have no way of ensuring the training would be as good as these players would get from professional coaches.

5. Many colleges might not have infrastructure to support full scholarships for more talented players or NIL money to offset what these kids would make if they turned pro.

Pros

1. Kids would have an extra 2-4 years of playing baseball before they started playing it for a living

2. Kids would be more physically developed before they started the rigors of professional baseball

3. NIL money would help mitigate, to a small extent, the money these kids would lose by not turning pro.

4. Travel ball for younger kids might be less stressful if players were just playing trying to get a college scholarship as compared to getting a fat pro contract. It doesn't mean that travel ball won't have pressure, but just that the pressure will be different and, IMO, less intense.

5. Development time in the minors would likely be 1-2 years shorter if a player went to college.

6. The current loose transfer portal rules would allow players to move around in college until they found the spot that was right to help their development.

7. This would eliminate putting 18 year olds who may never have lived away from home in less structured situations than they would get in college

8. Even kids who don't necessarily want to go to college would likely benefit in getting a free education in case their professional baseball dreams don't work out.

There are clear tradeoffs here but, similar to other topics in the CBA, discussions, it seems to boil down to one thing: when and how much money will the players be able to grab or the owners be able to keep.  

In my opinion, professional baseball would not be impacted negatively if drafting HS kids was banned, College baseball would be improved and, except for a very few players each year, kids would likely get to the majors at roughly the same rate.

So, let's eliminate drafting HS kids.  

THE OTHER ELEPHANT IN THE ROOM

There is still one significant issue that eliminating the drafting of graduated HS seniors will create.

The current amateur player acquisition process creates sort of a continuum of prospects in the minors.

16/17 year old international signees

18/19 year old HS kids

19/20 year old JUCO kids

20-24 year old college kids

If we eliminate drafting of kids who have not completed their sophomore year in college, we would create a gap of 3-4 years between the international FAs and the youngest US drafted player.  The young international kids would have to scale 3 levels (DSL, ASL, A ball) before most would be ready to compete against the youngest US draftee.  

I don't believe it is prudent to just move the signing age for international FAs to sign to match the US draftees.  Even creating an international draft would not help as the young international prospect system is really set up to get these kids into pro ball at a young age as there is no place for them to play and develop for an additional 3-4 years.  There are also socioeconomic reasons why it could be devastating for these young international signees to have to wait 2-3 years longer than they have to sign now.

That 3 year gap in age and development would mean that the international signees would be training against themselves for 3 years which is not ideal for their development, their education or their socialization into professional baseball.    I don't have an answer right now for how to handle this but, clearly, that solution would have to be incorporated into the next CBA.

2026 Draft - My Annual Shadow Draft

 OK, the draft is over and draft grades are starting to come in.  The one I have seen so far gives Cleveland the SECOND LOWEST GRADE IN THE MAJOR LEAUGES for their 2026 draft.

This is the part I hate about a draft.  Looking back and seeing what could have/should have happened.

So here is my draft, most of which is from my pre-draft and after first day mock drafts.  Where guys have already been selected by other teams, I simply slid guys up or plugged in guys of roughly the same ability.

1 - Hunter Dietz, LHP, Arnkansas

2. Ryan Peterson, RHP, Sam Houston St.

3. Nathan Taylor, RHP, Cincinnati [NOTE: It was Maxx Yehl but he was taken already]

4. Cal Randall, RHP, UCLA (NOTE: It was Josh McDevitt but he was taken already)

5. Eric Nachtheim RHP, McNeese St.

6. Cam Johnson, LHP, Oklahoma

7. Savion Sims, RHP, HS

8. Chris Katz, 1B, Mercer

9. Gavin Van Kempen, RHP, East Carolina

10. Christian Coppola, RHP, St. Joseph's

11. Mark Quatrani, C, Notre Dame

12. Grayson Fitzwater, 1B, VMI

13. Judd Utemark UTIL Ole Miss

Rounds 14-20 - HS pitchers and college power hitters

NOTE: These were all guys I had mentioned in my posts so I didn't just back engineer this shadow draft.

Willing to put this one in a time capsule and come back in the requisite 5 years.