Thursday, August 27, 2026

Thoughts For A Thursday - August 27th Edition

 On this off-day I had a lot of thoughts rattline around in my head:

The Guardians Hold Their Fate In Their Own Hands

This seems trite but looking at the remaining schedule, except for KC and Detroit, most of their opponents are exactly the ones they are fighting against, for the Central championship and the wildcard.  So often you need help from other teams to win a battle like this...and of course we appreciate any help we can get.  But the Guardians get to fight this out head to head.  Even the games against KC (who is extremely hot right now) and Detroit will not be easy as divisional games carry their own bragging rights, no matter the standings. We still have the 26th ranked strength of schedule so that helps.  But, no matter how this season turns out, this schedule is exactly who we want to play to EARN a post-season spot, and I am happy about that.

Don't Look Now, But Here Come The Mariners

For the last several weeks I preached patience and that by September 1st we would know where we were.  Why? Because we played nothing but teams that had bad overall records that it was our chance to make up ground quickly.  And we did.

But don't look now but Seattle is within 3 games of the AL West lead and 5 games of the 3rd wildcard and their remaining schedule has a .436 winning percentage.  That's .043 easier than the Guardians who sit 26th.  So, the Mariners WILL make up games and, IMO, are the current favorites to sneak up and win the AL West.  What happens to Texas and Houston will help determine the third wildcard team.

Ralphy or No Ralphy

That debate is all the rage on Twitter and other media.  So here's my take:

1. The "Ralphy is not being promoted" crew rightly cite that if he is promoted this year (one year before he has to be added to the 40-man) he could potentially not get to play next year during whatever work stoppage there is since guys on the 40-man would not be eligible to play in the minors.  While that is true, realize that MANY good prospects willl have to be rostered by teams this winter that the talent in AAA will be so diluted next year that it will look more like a AAAA league than it usually does  Currently, the average age in the International League is almost 27 years old.  This could spike to almost 28 years old or higher if guys like Velazquez *21 years old) can't play there next year.  Do you really think it is helpful next year for Ralphy to play against AAAA competition or get a taste of the majors this year and maybe help the team get to and do well in the playoffs?

2. The "Bring Ralphy Up Now" crew says that this team could use the jolt that he would bring.  While I think there is some of that (see Genao and even Watson promotions) we have to realize that Ralphy is far from a finished product and an Ingle-like debut is possible.  Plus, if CDL is limited to DH most of September, there really isn't a place for Ralphy.  But if Ralphy is brought up after September 1st his ABs don't count against his rookie eligibility but can help the team (Evan Carter for Texas a couple of years back). 

So where do I stand? Bring him up once the rosters expand.  You have to bring up someone and I just don't see how bringing up Watson, Schnee, Manzo, Ingle are going to help this team down the stretch any more than Ralphy would. You gotta bring someone up so bring up someone who might help now and in the playoffs.  Those other guys can still be added to the playoff roster (if we get there) in case of injuries but Ralphy is lightning in a bottle here and, despite his positional limitations, he's more likely to give us one good month than these other guys.

Who Is The Pitcher We Call Up?

We have a conondrum. We can bring up one pitcher come September 1st. We can also possibly demote Allen and maybe even Festa.  We have Espino, Aleman and Cecconi who could possible help our bullpen be more solid with Cecconin giving us Allen-like length.  

However, upsetting the apple cart at this point, with Festa and Allen pitching well, has significant risk associated with it. It's the brass ring grab hoping for additional victories (Aleman, Espino, Cecconi) or the status quo is good (Allen, Festa and, probably Cecconi) or some combination of the two.

How will they go?  I think, on September 1st, they will call up Cecconi and Espino and demote Allen. They will hold Aleman and Allen in reserve at AAA in case of injuries or bad performance by Espino.  Festa is just too solid right now and Espino and Cecconi add so much potential strength to this bullpen I can't see them going for less than this.

One other point: Ben Lively was, until tonight, looking good.  I think he may be a wildcard playoff pssibility but I see him spending the rest of CBus' season strengthening and lengthening.  

Latest MLB Proposal - More Rule 5 BS

Only if you are new here is there the possibility that you might think I liked MLB's proposal about the Rule 5. In fact I hate both sides' Rule 5 proposals.

I have shown in an earlier article that the ML portion of the Rule 5 doesn't work at the current eligibility levels.  Yet both sides want to shorten the time between a player being acquired and being R5 eligible? Absolutely stupid and showing an extreme lack of understanding of the Rule 5 draft and how totally worthless it is.  Which makes me laugh at the most recent proposals on this subject.

So, let me get this straight. Both MLB and MLBPA want to make players LESS experienced before they get this make-or-break opportunity to make a ML roster.  Plus the MLB put icing on that cake by saying that teams could possible send a Rule 5 pick to the minors.  Really?  How many times and ways do I have to provide data that says the Rule 5 doesn't work.  And that data doesn't include the likely millions of dollars that is spent by ML teams agonizing over who to protect and then figuring out if players from other teams might be good Rule 5 picks.

I have an idea. DO AWAY WITH THE DAMN RULE 5 DRAFT AND LET THESE GUYS DEVELOP IN THE SYSTEM THAT ACQUIRED THEM. I am fine with shortening minor league free agency to 5 years for college draftees or NDFAs.  I am even fine with shortening the time for ML free agency to 5 years of service time.  Plus, the overall roster restrictions in the affiliated US minor leagues for teams has already allowed players mobility that they didn't have a few years ago as every draft cycle causes minor leaguers to be cut so teams' draftees can be placed on this 165 player list each team has. But the crap these guys are proposing? No way.

Stop the BS.  Teams should get to fully develop the players they draft or sign as NDFAs.  Implementing any of the crap that has been suggested gives thos teams that spend the money to bring in players less of a chance to do that and, frankly, could lead to more trading of draft picks because those picks are less important if players don't get to develop. And, yes, living through Ted Stepien and DeShaun Watson, among others, I do not want front offices and cheap owners to have any more impetus to devalue obtaining amateur talent than they already do.  Allowing trading of draft picks allows them to do just that. As a fan of the Cleveland Guardians that is the exact opposite of what should happen.

Friday, August 14, 2026

Why We Need To Do Away With the Rule 5 Draft

 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

One of the proposals made by the MLBPA as the continuation of the Rule R5 draft.  I am not sure how serious the players are about keeping that draft or if it is just a negotiating ploy to create a throwaway item that they are readily willing to trade for something they really want.

But, whether or not the MLBPA really wants to keep the R5, this article provides data showing that the R5 draft should be discontinued as it is largely ineffective at its stated goal.

The article looks at demographics and statistics for players drafted in ML Rule 5 drafts from 2015-2024 and in the one year, 2021, when no ML Rule 5 draft occurred.  It also looks at the 2025 roster freeze to see who teams protected or did not protect in anticipation of the upcoming R5 draft.  The minor league phase of the R5 will not be considered in this article as there appears to be no evidence that the status quo for that phase will negatively impact future competitive balance or player opportunities to make major leagues.

My research showed that, while the ML R5 draft is one method to give some players a chance at playing in the ML before they would through normal development:
  • The ML R5 draft was only slightly more effective at giving players the opportunity to play in the majors and become successful than if those players had just stayed with their original team.
  • The R5 draft caused a number of players to have to play in the ML after having not played much, if at all, at levels above AA.  
  • The threat of potentially losing prospects to the Rule 5 has caused teams to roster players who are too early in their careers to be effective major leagues. This resulted in needlessly using up some or all of their minor league options before they are ready for the majors. 
  • In the one year, 2021, where no ML R5 draft was held, a number of prospects who likely would have been drafted wound up having ML success the next year (2022) and beyond with their organizations.
  • If we exclude a few players who had good careers after being drafted in the ML R5, many R5 draftees, even if they had long careers in the majors, were mostly used in low leverage situations (e.g., middle relievers, backup position players/role players)
  • R5 draftees often have very limited playing time in the season following when they are drafted. While a good number do get reasonable reps in their first year, the impression still exists that many are simply being stashed on the ML roster for the requisite one year (actually 90 days on the active roster)
  • Rostering of players not ready for the major leagues to protect them from the R5 draft creates 'dead spots' on the 40-man roster being taken for years by players who weren't ready to help the ML team.  This limits a team's roster flexibility and causes more experienced players to be DFA'd (or not signed at all) to make room for these young, not-ready-for-MLB prospects on the 40-man roster.
  • The R5 draft, in its current form, does little to redistribute talent from the richer teams to resource-limited teams. Instead, it mostly just shuffles prospects between the middle and bottom teams in baseball.
  • In summary, the ML R5 draft takes up a lot of resources from teams trying to prepare for that draft.  At the same time, the ML R5 draft is not effective in improving the competitive balance in baseball and does very little to get players chances at playing meaningful roles in the majors. It also doesn't appear to give players chances that they wouldn't have if they had just stayed with the team they were R5 drafted from.  The ML R5 draft should be eliminated so teams can build their 40 man rosters to be more competitive each year and prospects can develop at a normal rate and not pushed to the major leagues by an artificial construct like the ML R5 draft.
BACKGROUND

The Rule 5 draft has, in some form, existed for over 125 years.  The intent, before the Rule 4 draft was instituted in 1965, was to prevent the wealthiest teams from hoarding talent by offering the largest bonuses to, essentially, buy up all the best amateur players.  Once a player was signed by a team, he was considered perpetually bound to that team as long as they continued to offer him even a minor league contract.  A number of rule changes have been made to try to stop this practice:
  • The original Rule 5 - While this had many variations over the years, teams could draft players from other teams as a way to negate, to some extent, this hoarding. Many of the players attributed as successes in the Rule 5 draft (e.g., Roberto Clemente and George Bell) were actually obtained as part of the original first year player draft, where players could be drafted by other teams after they had played professionally for only one year.
  • In 1965 the amateur draft was started with the goal of allowing all teams to have more equal access to amateur talent BEFORE they were signed by the wealthiest teams.
  • In 1975 this 'reserve clause' was challenged and an arbiter made a ruling that abolished the reserve clause and established free agency. ML players could then become free agents after 6 full seasons in the majors.  
  • Shortly after the reserve clause was invalidated, it was also established that players not on a team's 40-man roster could become minor league free agents after they had 6 full years in professional baseball.  
  • Shortly after that, the rules were changed so that players on a team's 40 man roster could only be sent to the minors in three different seasons without having to pass through waivers before they could be sent down a 4th time. [NOTE: in some cases MLB grants a 4th option year to teams for certain players]
  • Players who have been DFA'd one time can elect free agency if they are DFA'd a second time.
  • Players with enough ML service time can elect free agency instead of being sent to the minors
  • In 2022 the number of players a team can have in their US minor league system was limited to 165.
All these rule changes have, when considered together, addressed a lot of what the original Rule 5 was intended to address. Amateur players are now acquired more equitably and players are allowed to move from organization to organization more freely. 

So, the question becomes:

HAS THE MAJOR LEAGUE PORTION OF THE RULE 5 DRAFT OUTLIVED ITS USEFULNESS?

We have calls for a salary cap to keep well-financed teams from just buying championships.  We have calls for a salary floor to make the owners with limited resources spend more money to at least attempt to be competitive and/or keep their own players instead of trading them as they approach free agency.  Both these proposals, like the original intent of the Rule 5 draft, is to improve competitive balance.  

But is the Rule 5 draft, at the present time, really improving competitive balance?

[Note: All the data below comes from me counting up players.  Even though I checked my work, it is quite possible that I overcounted or undercounted by 1 or 2 in some of these categories.]

Looking at the 9 R5 drafts from 2015-2024 (there was no ML portion of the R5 draft in 2021) here is what I found:
  • 130 players were drafted in the MLR5 draft.  59 were NOT returned to their original team while 71 were offered back
  • The Yankees had the most (21) players drafted but only 4 of them were not returned. The team with the 2nd most players drafted was Cleveland (9), followed by Tampa Bay and the Dodgers (8). Baltimore (12) and Philadelphia (9) drafted the most players.
  • 23 of 30 teams had at least 1 player who was drafted and NOT returned, 28 teams (not LAD or NYY) selected at least 1 player with 25 teams selecting at least 2 or more in this period.
  • No team had more than 4 players that were lost for good in this period.
These numbers clearly give the impression that, for the most part, teams were just re-arranging the deck chairs within the financial lower echelon of teams and that redistribution of talent to those teams from well-financed teams was not effective.

Let's look at some more numbers from the R5 drafts during this period:
  • Of the 71 players who were returned to their original teams
    • 29 returned players (41%) NEVER played in the majors
    • 8 returned players only played briefly for the major league team that drafted them. Once they were returned, they never played in the majors again.
    • 13 of the remaining returned 34 players (38%) made their major league debut with their original team the season after they were drafted in the ML R5 and a total of 25 (74%) made their ML debuts in the first 2 seasons after they were drafted.
    • 9 of those 34 players (26%) returned who played in the majors after they were returned have had major league careers of 5 years or longer, 21 (62%) have had ML careers of 2 years or longer so far.
  • Of the 59 players who were NOT returned to their original team
    • As said above, 59 of 130 (45%) of R5 drafted players were not returned to the team they were drafted from and, therefore, most made their ML debut the season after they were R5 drafted.
    • 21 (35%) have had ML careers of 5 years or longer and 38 (59%) have had ML careers of at least 2 years so far.
    • 32 of the 59 (54%) players not returned have had ML careers as mostly middle relievers, 5 have been leverage relievers and 6 are starting pitchers. The remaining 16 are position players.  Aside from the SP and leverage relievers, most of the 59 players not returned have had careers as low leverage players.
  • Notable players from these drafts include
    • Players returned to their original team : Nester Cortez Jr., Trevor Megill, Will Vest
    • Players who were not returned: Anthony Santander, Brad Keller, Shane Smith, Mitch Spence, Liam Hicks, Garrett Whitlock and Jordan Romano.
    • Therefore, over these 9 drafts there was, on average, one player per year who had a career as a high leverage player and 70% of those were players who were R5 drafted and not returned.
  • The highest playing level a drafted player had obtained (using MLB's rookie definitions as a rough guide) at the time they were drafted were:
    • AAA: not returned to their original team (19), returned (21)
    • AA: not returned (26), returned (32)
    • A+ : not returned (8), returned (10)
    • A: not returned (3), returned (6)
    • Rookie ball: not returned (1),  returned (1)
    • Previous MLB experience: not returned (2), returned (1)
  • Using the numbers above, players drafted in these R5 drafts were mostly at AA or lower in their development at the time they were drafted.
    • 40 AAA
    • 58 AA
    • 18 A+
    • 9 A
    • 3 Rookie League
  • The 59 players taken in these rule 5 drafts who were not returned filled the following roles in the ML careers:
    • Middle reliever (32)
    • Starting pitcher (6)
    • Leverage reliever (5)
    • Position player (usually platoon or backup) (16)
  • Major league average for players making their ML debuts is 24-25 years old and the number of times players had to be sent to the minors after their debut before they stuck in the majors is twice.
    • Players not returned averaged 2.2 times returning to the minors before they stuck in the majors
    • Players returned and not returned both had an average age of about 24.5 years old at the time they made their ML debuts.
Looking at these second set of numbers gives the following impressions:
  • Players who were returned to their original team actually had similar chances to make the ML, even in the year after they were drafted in the ML R5 draft to R5 draftees who were not returned.
  • 88 of 130 (67%) drafted likely were not ready for the major leagues when they were drafted in the R5.as they had spent most or all of their careers up to that point in AA or lower levels.
  • While players who were not returned generally had good major league careers, a number of players who WERE returned had good major league careers, as well.  This is even more compelling as you would guess that the players who were NOT returned had, by definition, a much greater likelihood of having good careers as they were likely more talented and ML ready than the players who were returned. 
  • Finally, given the rules behind the Rule 5 draft, it appears the data supports that teams drafting players in the ML R5 are looking for players they can put in low leverage situations (e.g., middle relievers) in their first year with the idea that those players might develop into more later.  The data, however, doesn't support that to be true.

WHAT IS THE TRUTH ABOUT RULE 5 DRAFTEES BECOMING ALL-STARS?

Various sources list up to 41 players drafted in the Rule 5 draft who became all-stars since the early 1960s. As it turns out, after looking at this closely:
  • 17 players drafted in the ML portion of the R5 and not returned fit today's criteria for what a ML R5 draft pick looks like and who also became an all-star.
  • 10 became all-stars AFTER being returned 
  • Of those 17, three (Jeff Nelson, Willie Hernandez and Ryan Pressly) became all-stars 8-10 years after they were drafted in the ML portion of the R5
  • 3 (George Bell, Paul Blair, Dave May) were drafted in the R5 when you could be drafted after playing as little as one year of professional baseball and May and Blair, in particular, were really not Rule 5 draft picks at all, rather being part of a different draft of players with one year of professional experience. [NOTE: Other supposed ML R5 success stories like Roberto Clemente were not actually R5 draft picks, either. Clemente was drafted to Pittsburgh after only one year of minor league baseball]
  • One additional player (Jason Grilli) became an all-star after playing for 3 ML teams before he was drafted in the R5
  • An additional five Rule 5 draftees became all-stars after being selected in the minor league portion of the R5 draft
  • One of the 17 (Derrick Turnbow) appeared to have required 4 minor league options before he established himself in the big leagues and became an all-star
  • One of the 17, Josh Hamilton, was not even playing baseball when he was selected in the Rule 5 draft and turned his career around to become an all-star
In summary, the data above suggest the following
  • It is slightly more likely (17 to 10) that ML R5 draftees who are not returned become all-stars compared to those who are returned after the R5 draft.
  • There were a number of players, e.g., George Bell, who are portrayed as R5 success stories when, in fact, their entry into the R5 did not even fit today's criteria for being R5-eligible, making these lists of R5 success studies questionable.
  • The number of all-stars (5) who came out of the minor league phase of the R5 adds support to keeping this phase going in the future.
  • The number of ML R5 draftees who became all-stars, when each example is looked at closely, implies that these cases are more anecdotal than a trend and, therefore, do not support continuation of the ML R5 draft.

ARE PLAYERS SELECTED IN THE ML R5 LIKELY TO JUST BE STASHED ON A ML ROSTER FOR A SEASON SO THEY DON'T HAVE TO BE RETURNED TO THEIR ORIGINAL TEAM?

Looking at the 59 players who were not returned, here is the usage data for those players in their first year after being selected in the ML R5 draft. 

If a player met or surpassed the usage limits below in their first year they were considered to be used appropriately and not just stashed on the ML roster to fulfill the R5 requirement.

Relief pitchers: 35 games
Starting pitchers/swingmen: 70 innings
Position players: 300 plate appearances

The number of players for each type who met these criteria

POSITION PLAYERS: 4 met the PA criteria, 13 did not and so were considered 'stashed'

STARTING PITCHERS/SWINGMAN: 6 met the criteria, 0 did not

RELIEF PITCHERS: 18 met the criteria, 9 did not

INJURED LIST - 7 could not complete requirements

From the data above it can be concluded that most (73%) of pitchers drafted in the ML R5 draft from 2015-2024 were used enough in their first year to not be considered just stashed on the major league roster so they wouldn't have to be returned. On the other hand, only a few (24%) of position players played regularly enough to NOT be considered 'stashed' on the major league roster.

It does appear that most of the pitchers drafted in these ML R5 drafts did pitch enough in their first year to NOT delay their development.  However, it does appear that many of the position players were, met the criteria for low usage and, therefore, being stashed on the ML bench for their first year, likely delaying their development as baseball players.  Thus, the overall impression is that some of the ML R5 draftees are stashed on ML rosters although many are NOT stashed, using my definition.  As a proviso, this is not to say that these players had increased roles in their 2nd year after being drafted in the ML R5 draft, but at least a lot did not have their development terribly hampered by just sitting on the bench in their first year. 

WHICH PROSPECTS DO TEAMS TEND TO PROTECT FROM THE RULE 5?

It would have taken more time than I could devote to this project to look back for 10 years at which R5-eligible prospects teams chose to protect.  So I just looked at what the demographics were for the prospects teams chose to (and not to) protect against the upcoming 2025 ML R5 draft. Looking at the MLB article on which TOP prospects each organization protected (or did not protect) from the 2025 ML R5 draft by their roster additions this November, the highest level these players achieved (using MLB's rookie eligibility rules to establish if a player has had enough experience at the top level they had played in to have been able to graduate from that level), coming out of the November 2025 roster freeze was:
  • AAA: Protected (40), not protected (20)
  • AA: Protected (37), not protected (36)
  • A+ : Protected (6), not protected (21)
  • A: Protected (1), not protected (3)
Looking at these numbers, teams in 2025 seemed to prioritize protecting players who were close to ML-ready, with emphasis on players with significant AAA experience. Although players with less upper level experience may have been better prospects, teams seemed to be gambling that those less experienced players would not be drafted and, if drafted, would not be able to stick with a ML team.

ANECDOTALS

In my research and listening to people argue for and against the ML R5 draft over the years, I have encountered (or propagated) the following anecdotals regarding the ML R5:
  • The ML R5 draft gives players who might not be developing in a system a chance to move to another system where they CAN develop. [NOTE: I have seen no evidence of that in my research and, even if it did occur, it would be very anecdotal]
  • Teams dedicate a lot of time and money analyzing their prospects, analyzing other teams' trends in the Rule 5 and analyzing players available in the Rule 5 after the roster freeze is announced. [NOTE: While this is another one of those things that appears obvious, I have found no evidence that this is true.  I will say this, though. For small market teams that are resource -challenged, they could probably find a better way to use their analytics and team resources if they didn't have to worry about the ML R5 draft.] 
  • Fear of the R5 draft causes teams to protect players earlier than they should, just to avoid the risk of losing a prospect.  [NOTE: While there is anecdotal evidence of that (e.g., Jhonkensy Noel protected by Cleveland when he barely had played in A+ and Juan Brito being protected when he had just completed a season of A ball) I did not see any evidence that teams routinely protect large numbers of A+ or A players (or lower) against the R5.  It does happen, but it does not appear to be common.]
  • The ML R5 gives players a chance to get to the major leagues quicker than they normally would.  [NOTE: My research has shown this may be a fallacy created just because it is impossible to look at an alternate future where a player stays with their organization instead of being drafted. I will acknowledge that this is possible but, to me, is unimportant as the issues the ML R5 creates for players AND teams greatly outweigh the benefits for these few players, if they exist, which I could not prove through my research AND because there is ample evidence that a good percentage of returned players make it to the majors with the organization they were drafted from either that season or the next one.]
  • We need a R5 draft because, without it, there is a chance that a player could be held by a team for 9 years (6 as a minor leaguer and 3 option years if he is rostered near the end of his first 6 years).  [NOTE: I acknowledge that is a possibility, but I think it is probably just theoretically possible or, at best, very anecdotal.  Again, exceptions cannot drive the continuation of the ML R5 draft.] 
  • Players are emotionally scarred if they don't make it to the make it to the majors as a ML R5 draftee. [NOTE: I have anecdotal evidence that this is true from interviewing players who have been ML R5 draftees but, to my knowledge, no studies have been done to show that this is true.]
  • Players not returned suffer developmental delays in their baseball career as a result of being 'stashed' on a big league roster (and bench) for a season, seldomly playing. [NOTE: Another example of something that appears to be obvious.  My research did show that many of these players were sent back to the minors (sometimes the low minors) the season following their ML R5 draft season, staying in the minors, sometimes, for a number of seasons before they returned to the major leagues for good. However, my research failed to show that this stashing occurred frequently nor was it necessarily a factor in delaying their development.  Rather, players who are returned to their original team don't appear to develop any faster or turn into better players than those who are NOT returned and are seldomly used in their first ML season.]

THE ML R5 DRAFT THAT NEVER HAPPENED

In 2021, teams set their ML rosters and their AAA reserve lists as usual, but the ML R5 draft never happened that year due, in part, to the lockout as the new CBA was still being negotiated.  This gave a unique chance for study of what would happen if the ML R5 draft was abolished and prospects who might have otherwise been drafted just stuck with their original team until they were rostered or just became 6 year minor league free agents..  That is, a lot of the proponents of the ML R5 draft point to the all-stars, MVPs and HOFers that have come out of this draft without considering whether those players would have achieved the same status if they had just staying with the organization that had spent years and lots of money to sign and develop them.

So let's take a look at some of the significant players who would have been available for the 2021 ML R5 draft and what happened to them in 2022 and in 2023-2025.  I will admit that, at this point, I am worn down from the research that I have done for this article.  I also acknowledge that I was not able to find, for 2021, an article like I found for 2025 that listed all the top prospects for each team that were or were not protected against the ML R5.  So the list I am about to give you is absolutely anecdotal, but it's the best I could do at the moment;  So here is the list of significant prospects I have found who were not protected against the 2021 ML R5 draft that never happened [NOTE: list is in no particular order]::

1. Yainer Diaz
2. Oscar Gonzalez
3. Will Benson
4. Joey Cantillo
5. Cooper Hummel
6. Lenyn Sosa
7. Kody Clemens
8. Jordan Diaz

Obviously this is just a cursory look.  I am sure if I could see a list of the top prospects team chose NOT to protect in 2021 more names would jump out.  In addition, teams had their lists of players they would consider drafting that might be in addition to the list above.  Just by inspection, this looks like a pretty decent list of players who could have easily been lost had there been a ML R5 draft in 2021.  The takeaway for me from this list is that players succeed or fail, in many cases, irrespective of the organization they are in but, rather, based on how talented they are.  It supports the presumption that a number of the biggest success stories coming out of the ML R5 draft would have been successes if there had NOT been a ML R5 draft.  

In my opinion, this just adds to the overall data that supports that the ML R5 draft is not needed and, in fact, can actually hurt the teams it should be helping, the resource-limited teams.

Wednesday, August 12, 2026

Guardians Top 75 Prospects - Mid-Season/Pody-Deadline Edition

After thinking about it, I barely could come up with 75 prospects so I cut it off there.  Apologies to anyone who was looking for a top 100 here.

1. Ralphy Velasquez
2. Angel Genao
3. Jaison Chourio
4. Liam Peterson
5. Juniker Caceras
6. Robert Arias - The injury is a concern but I am soooo high on this guy.
7. Braylon Doughty
8. Cooper Ingle
9. Daniel Espino
10. Franco Aleman
11. Jace LaViolette
12. Dean Curley
13. Alfonsin Rosario
14. Welbyn Francisco
15. Svert Reinoso
16. Dauri Fernandez
17. Yorman Gomez
18. Aaron Walton
19. Andrew Walters
20. Tre Broussard
21. Justin Campbell
22. Franklin Gomez
23. Joey Oakie
24. Khalil Watson
25. Nolan Schubart
26. Lucas Moore
27. Khal Stephen
28. Ryan Cessarini
29. Kody Huff
30. George Valera\
31. Bennett Thompson
32. Luke Hill
33. Kade Lewis
34. Milan Tolentino
35. Jackson Humphries
36. Aaron Davenport
37. Gabriel Rodriguez
38. Savion Sims
39. Deiten LaChance
40 Luis De La Cruz
41. Jacob Zibin
42. Austin Peterson
43. Trenton Denholm
44. Michael Kennedy
45. Will Hynes 
46. Rorik Maltrud
47. Reiner Herrera
48. Heinz Brito
49. Jogly Garcia
50. Hiverson Lopez
51. Cam Sullivan
52. Chase Mobley
53. Magnus Ellerts 
54. Logun Clark 
55. Anthony Martinez 
56. Dayan Frias
57. Tommy Hawke
58. Alex Mooney
59. Luis Merejo
60. Jose Devers
61. Aiden Major
62. Caden Favors
63. Juan Benjamin
64. Esteban Gonzalez
65. Rafe Schlesinger
66. Ryan Prager
67. Johan Rodriguez
68. Yeiferth Castillo
69, Melkelis Hernandez
70. Maick Collado
71. Jose Pirela
72. Evelio Hernandez
73. Cam Schuelke
74. Rafeliz Lara
75. Alejandro Blasco