What Should We Do Instead of the ML Rule 5?

 As a follow-up to my last post talking about whether the ML R5 draft should be discontinued, here are my suggestions on what should be done instead of having a ML R5

• Continue the minor league portion of the Rule 5 draft. Teams would still be able to protect up to 78 players in their organization from this draft (40 man ML roster and 38 spots on their AAA reserve list).  I think this draft is necessary as it does give 2nd and 3rd tier prospects the chance to move to another organization to continue their minor league development in a normal manner AND it limits stockpiling and gives teams a chance to right size their 165 man organizational roster.  Also, although infrequent, major league players HAVE come out of minor league R5 draft.

• I would swap dates for the roster freeze date and the non-tender date.  It continues to make no sense to my why you would set your roster THEN remove more players from that roster. I think this is less of a problem if there is no ML R5 draft as teams will not have to waste spots on their 40 man roster on players who likely will not help them that year or, in some cases, for a few years. Still, setting your roster, whether it is 40 man or 78, should be done AFTER you know which players the team would non-tender and if any non-tendered players would be added to a roster before it was frozen.

• With the elimination of the ML R5 draft, in main way left to eliminate prospects hoarding would be the minor league free agency rule.  Right now, a player not on a 40 man roster can choose to become a free agent after 6 full seasons in the minors.  What I propose is to modify that rule to take into account that we have so many 16 year old players brought into ML organizations every year. Those players can become 6 year minor league free agents as early as 22 years olds when they are still in the steep part of their development curve.  At the same time, college seniors can come in as 22-, 23- or even, in rare cases, 24-year olds after having high level coaching for years and years before they even turned pro.  In order to give teams a fair chance to develop their prospects and give older prospects a chance to change organizations before they get too old, I suggest changing the limits on when a player could become a minor league free agent as follows:
• Players signed when they are 16- or 17-year olds can become minor league free agents after SEVEN FULL SEASONS in the minors (up from the current 6 years)
• Players signed as 18- or 19-year olds could reach minor league free agency after SIX FULL SEASONS
• Players signed as 20- or 21-year olds could become minor league free agents after FIVE FULL SEAONS
• Players signed as 22-year olds or older could become minor league free agents after FOUR FULL SEASONS

I think these changes/continuations will give players more freedom to change teams before they get to their late 20s AND give teams a fair chance to develop their very young prospects before potentially having to choose between losing them to minor league free agency or placing them on the 40 man roster before they are ready to play in the majors. 

I have heard feedback that elimination of the ML R5 needs to come with other, related, changes so this is my proposal for those related changes.

Is The Major League Portion of the Rule 5 Draft Still Good For Baseball?

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This article looks at demographics and statistics for players drafted in ML Rule 5 drafts from 2015-2024 and in the one year, 2021, when no ML Rule 5 draft occurred. The minor league phase of the R5 will not be considered in this article as there appears to be no evidence that the status quo for that phase will negatively impact future competitive balance or player opportunities to make the major leagues.

The data from my research showed that, while the ML R5 draft is one method to give some players a chance at playing in the ML before they would through normal development:

• The ML R5 draft was only slightly more effective at giving players the opportunity to play in the majors and become successful than if those players had just stayed with their original team.
• The R5 draft caused a number of players to have to play in the ML after having not played much, if at all, at levels above AA.  
• The threat of potentially losing prospects to the Rule 5 has caused teams to roster players to protect them from the Rule 5 draft too early in their careers, resulting in needlessly use up some or all of their minor league options before they are ready for the majors.
• In the one year, 2021, where no ML R5 draft was held, a number of prospects who likely would have been drafted wound up having ML success the next year (2022) and beyond with their organizations.
• If we exclude a few players who had good careers after being drafted in the ML R5, most R5 draftees, even if they had long careers in the majors, were mostly used in low leverage situations (e.g., middle relievers, backup position players/role players)
• R5 draftees often have very limited playing time in the season following when they are drafted. The impression is that many are simply being stashed on the ML roster for the requisite one year (actually 90 days on the active roster)
• Rostering of players not ready for the major leagues to protect them from the R5 draft creates 'dead spots' on the 40-man roster being taken for years by players who weren't ready to help the ML team.  This limits a team's roster flexibility and causes more experienced players to be DFA'd to make room for these young, not-ready-for-MLB prospects on the 40-man roster.
• The R5 draft, in its current form, does little to redistribute talent from the richer teams to resource-limited teams. Instead, it mostly just shuffles prospects between the middle and bottom teams in baseball.
• In summary, the ML R5 draft is not effective in improving the competitive balance in baseball and does very little to get players chances at playing meaningful roles in the majors. It also doesn't appear to give players chances that they wouldn't have if they had just stayed with the team they were R5 drafted from.  The ML R5 draft should be eliminated so teams can build their 40 man rosters to be more competitive each year and prospects can develop at a normal rate and not pushed to the major leagues by an artificial construct like the ML R5 draft.

BACKGROUND

The Rule 5 draft has, in some form, existed for over 125 years.  The intent, before the Rule 4 draft was instituted in 1965, was to prevent the wealthiest teams from hoarding talent by offering the largest bonuses to, essentially, buy up all the best amateur players.  Once a player was signed by a team, he was considered perpetually bound to that team as long as they continued to offer him even a minor league contract.  A number of rule changes have been made to try to stop this practice:

• The original Rule 5 - Teams could draft players from other teams as a way to negate, to some extent, this hoarding.
• In 1965 the amateur draft was started with the goal of allowing all teams to have more equal access to amateur talent BEFORE they were signed by the wealthiest teams.
• In 1975 this 'reserve clause' was challenged and an arbiter made a ruling that abolished the reserve clause and established free agency. ML players could then become free agents after 6 full seasons in the majors.  
• Shortly after the reserve clause was invalidated, it was also established that players not on a team's 40-man roster could become minor league free agents after they had 6 full years in professional baseball.  
• Shortly after that, the rules were changed so that players on a team's 40 man roster could only be sent to the minors in three different seasons without having to pass through waivers before they could be sent down a 4th time. [NOTE: in some cases MLB grants a 4th option year to teams for certain players]
• Players who have been DFA'd one time can elect free agency if they are DFA'd a second time.
• Players with enough ML service time can elect free agency instead of being sent to the minors
• In 2022 the number of players a team can have in their US minor league system was limited to 165.

All these rule changes have, when considered together, addressed a lot of what the original Rule 5 was intended to address. Amateur players are now acquired more equitably and players are allowed to move from organization to organization more freely. 

So, the question becomes:

HAS THE MAJOR LEAGUE PORTION OF THE RULE 5 DRAFT OUTLIVED ITS USEFULNESS?

We have calls for a salary cap to keep well-financed teams from just buying championships.  We have calls for a salary floor to make the owners with limited resources spend more money to at least attempt to be competitive and/or keep their own players instead of trading them as they approach free agency.  Both these proposals, like the original intent of the Rule 5 draft, is to improve competitive balance.  

But is the Rule 5 draft, at the present time, really improving competitive balance?

[Note: All the data below comes from me counting up players.  Even though I checked my work, it is quite possible that I overcounted or undercounted by 1 or 2 in some of these categories.]

Looking at the 9 R5 drafts from 2015-2024 (there was no ML portion of the R5 draft in 2021) here is what we find:

• 130 players were drafted in the MLR5 draft.  59 were NOT returned to their original team while 71 were offered back
• The Yankees had the most (21) players drafted but only 4 of them were not returned. The team with the 2nd most players drafted was Cleveland (9), followed by Tampa Bay and the Dodgers (8). Baltimore (12) and Philadelphia (9) drafted the most players.
• 23 of 30 teams had at least 1 player who was drafted and NOT returned, 28 teams (not LAD or NYY) selected at least 1 player with 25 teams selecting at least 2 or more in this period.
• No team had more than 4 players that were lost for good in this period.

These numbers clearly give the impression that, for the most part, teams were just re-arranging the deck chairs.

Let's look at some more numbers from the R5 drafts during this period:

• Of the 71players who were returned to their original teams
• 29 returned players (41%) NEVER played in the majors
• 8 returned players only played briefly for the team that drafted them before they were returned.
• 13 of the remaining returned 34 players (38%) made their major league debut the next season with their original team, 25 (74%) made their ML debuts in the first 2 seasons after they were drafted in the R5 and returned to their original team.
• 9 of those 34 players (26%) returned who played in the majors after they were returned have had major league careers of 5 years or longer, 21 (62%) have had ML careers of 2 years or longer so far.
• Of the 59 players who were NOT returned to their original team
• As said above, 59 of 130 (45%) of R5 drafted players were not returned to the team they were drafted from and, therefore, made their ML debut the season after they were R5 drafted.
• 21 (35%) have had ML careers of 5 years or longer and 38 (59%) have had ML careers of at least 2 years so far.
• 32 of the 59 (54%) players not returned have had ML careers as mostly middle relievers, 5 have been leverage relievers and 6 are starting pitchers. The remaining 16 are position players.  Aside from the SP and leverage relievers, most of the 59 players not returned have had careers as low leverage players.
• Notable players from these drafts include
• Players returned to their original team : Nester Cortez Jr., Trevor Megill, Will Vest
• Players who were not returned: Anthony Santander, Brad Keller, Shane Smith, Mitch Spence, Liam Hicks, Garrett Whitlock and Jordan Romano.
• Therefore, over these 9 drafts there was, on average, one player per year who had a career as a high leverage player and 70% of those were players who were R5 drafted and not returned.
• The highest playing level (using MLB's rookie definitions as a rough guide) at the time they were drafted were:
• AAA: not returned to their original team (19), returned (21)
• AA: not returned (26), returned (32)
• A+ : not returned (8), returned (10)
• A: not returned (3), returned (6)
• Rookie ball: not returned (1),  returned (1)
• Previous MLB experience: not returned (2), returned (1)
• Using the numbers above, players drafted in these R5 drafts were mostly at AA or lower in their development at the time they were drafted.
• 40 AAA
• 58 AA
• 18 A+
• 9 A
• 3 Rookie League
• The 59 players taken in these rule 5 drafts who were not returned filled the following roles in the ML careers:
• Middle reliever (32)
• Starting pitcher (6)
• Leverage reliever (5)
• Position player (usually platoon or backup) (16)
• Major league average for players making their ML debuts is 24-25 years old and the number of times players had to be sent to the minors after their debut before they stuck in the majors is twice.
• Players not returned averaged 2.2 times returning to the minors before they stuck in the majors
• Players returned and not returned both had an average age of about 24.5 years old at the time they made their ML debuts.

Looking at these second set of numbers gives the following impressions:

• Players who were returned to their original team actually had similar chances to make the ML, even in the year after they were drafted in the ML R5 draft to R5 draftees who were not returned.
• 88 of 130 (67%) drafted likely were not ready for the major leagues when they were drafted in the R5.as they had spent most or all of their careers up to that point in AA or lower levels.
• While players who were not returned generally had good major league careers, a number of players who WERE returned had good major league careers, as well.  This is even more compelling as you would guess that the players who were NOT returned had, by definition, a much greater likelihood of having good careers as they were likely more talented and ML ready than the playrs who were returned. 

WHAT IS THE TRUTH ABOUT RULE 5 DRAFTEES BECOMING ALL-STARS?

Various sources list up to 41 players drafted in the Rule 5 draft who became all-stars since the early 1960s. As it turns out, after looking at this closely:

• 17 players drafted in the ML portion of the R5 and not returned fit today's criteria for what a ML R5 draft pick looks like and who also became an all-star.
• 10 became all-stars AFTER being returned 
• Of those 17, three (Jeff Nelson, Willie Hernandez and Ryan Pressly) became all-stars 8-10 years after they were drafted in the ML portion of the R5
• 3 (George Bell, Paul Blair, Dave May) were drafted in the R5 when you could be drafted after playing as little as one year of professional baseball and May and Blair, in particular, were really not Rule 5 draft picks at all, rather being part of a different draft of players with one year of professional experience. [NOTE: Other supposed ML R5 success stories like Roberto Clemente were not actually R5 draft picks, either. He was drafted to Pittsburgh after one year of minor league baseball]
• One additional player (Jason Grilli) became an all-star after playing for 3 ML teams before he was drafted in the R5
• An additional five Rule 5 draftees became all-stars after being selected in the minor league portion of the R5 draft
• One of the 17 (Derrick Turnbow) appeared to have required 4 minor league options before he established himself in the big leagues and became an all-star
• One of the 17, Josh Hamilton, was not even playing baseball when he was selected in the Rule 5 draft and turned his career around to become an all-star

In summary, the data above suggest the following

• It is slightly more likely (17 to 10) that ML R5 draftees who are not returned become all-stars compared to those who are returned after the R5 draft.
• There were a number of players, e.g., George Bell, who are portrayed as R5 success stories when, in fact, their entry into the R5 did not even fit today's criteria for being R5-eligible
• The number of all-stars (5) who came out of the minor league phase of the R5 adds support to keeping this phase going in the future.
• The number of ML R5 draftees who became all-stars, when each example is looked at closely, implies that these cases are more anecdotal than a trend that supports continuation of the ML R5 draft.

ARE PLAYERS SELECTED IN THE ML R5 LIKELY TO JUST BE STASHED ON A ML ROSTER FOR A SEASON SO THEY DON'T HAVE TO BE RETURNED TO THEIR ORIGINAL TEAM?

Looking at the 59 players who were not returned, here is the usage data for those players in their first year after being selected in the ML R5 draft. 

If a player met or surpassed the usage limits below in their first year they were considered to be used appropriately and not just stashed on the ML roster to fulfill the R5 requirement.

Relief pitchers: 35 games

Starting pitchers/swingmen: 70 innings

Position players: 300 plate appearances

The number of players for each type who met these criteria

POSITION PLAYERS: 4 met the PA criteria, 13 did not and so were considered 'stashed'

STARTING PITCHERS/SWINGMAN: 6 met the criteria, 0 did not

RELIEF PITCHERS: 18 met the criteria, 9 did not

INJURED LIST - 7 could not complete requirements

From the data above it can be concluded that most (73%) of pitchers drafted in the ML R5 draft from 2015-2024 were used enough in their first year to not be considered just stashed on the major league roster so they wouldn't have to be returned. On the other hand, only a few (24%) of position players played regularly enough to NOT be considered 'stashed' on the major league roster.

It does appear that most of the pitchers drafted in these ML R5 drafts did pitch enough in their first year to NOT delay their development.  However, it does appear that the many of the position players were, met the criteria for low usage and, therefore, being stashed on the ML bench for their first year, likely delaying their development as baseball players.  This is not to say that these players had increased roles in their 2nd year after being drafted in the ML R5 draft, but at least their development was not terribly hampered by just sitting on the bench in their first year. 

WHICH PROSPECTS DO TEAMS TEND TO PROTECT FROM THE RULE 5?

It would have taken more time than I could devote to this project to look back for 10 years at which R5-eligible prospects teams chose to protect.  So I just looked at what the demographics were for the prospects teams chose to (and not to) protect against the upcoming 2025 ML R5 draft. Looking at the MLB article on which TOP prospects each organization protected (or did not protect) from the 2025 ML R5 draft by their roster additions this November, the highest level these players achieved (using MLB's rookie eligibility rules to establish if a player has had enough experience at the top level they had played in to have been able to graduate from that level), here is the breakdown of the top minor league level the protected and top unprotected prospects coming out of the November 2025 roster freeze had achieved.

• AAA: Protected (40), not protected (20)
• AA: Protected (37), not protected (36)
• A+ : Protected (6), not protected (21)
• A: Protected (1), not protected (3)

Looking at these numbers, teams in 2025 seemed to prioritize protecting players who were close to ML-ready, with emphasis on players with significant AAA experience. Although players with less upper level experience may have been better prospects, teams seemed to be gambling on their low minor league players not being drafted because of the small likelihood those inexperienced players would be drafted and, if drafted, would be able to stick with a ML team.

ANECDOTALS

In my research and listening to people argue for and against the ML R5 draft over the years, I have encountered (or propagated) the following anecdotals regarding the ML R5:

• The ML R5 draft gives players who might not be developing in a system a chance to move to another system where they CAN develop. [NOTE: I have seen no evidence of that in my research and, even if it did occur, it would be very anecdotal]
• Players drafted in the ML R5 process are likely to have their development stunted by the lack of playing time they receive while they are simply being 'stashed' on the ML roster so that they don't have to be returned to their original team [NOTE: While this ie eminently reasonable, I have found no concrete evidence of this and it would be difficult to prove as there are too many variables for the relatively few players chosen in the ML R5]
• Teams dedicate a lot of time and money analyzing their prospects, analyzing other teams' trends in the Rule 5 and analyzing players available in the Rule 5 after the roster freeze is announced. [NOTE: While this is another one of those things that appears obvious, I have found no evidence that this is true.  I will say this, though. For small market teams that are resource -challenged, they could probably find a better way to use their analytics and team resources if they didn't have to worry about the ML R5 draft.] 
• Fear of the R5 draft causes teams to protect players earlier than they should, just to avoid the risk of losing a prospect.  [NOTE: While there is anecdotal evidence of that (e.g., Jhonkensy Noel protected by Cleveland when he barely had played in A+ and Juan Brito being protected when he had just completed a season of A ball) I did not see any evidence that teams routinely protect large numbers of A+ or A players (or lower) against the R5.  It does happen, but it does not appear to be common.]
• The ML R5 gives players a chance to get to the major leagues quicker than they normally would.  [NOTE: My research has shown this may be a fallacy created just because it is impossible to look at an alternate future where a player stays with their organization instead of being drafted. I will acknowledge that this is possible but, to me, is unimportant as the issues the ML R5 creates for players AND teams greatly outweigh the benefits for these few players, if they exist, which I could not prove through my research]
• We need a R5 draft because, without it, there is a chance that a player could be held by a team for 9 years (6 as a minor leaguer and 3 option years if he is rostered near the end of his first 6 years).  [NOTE: I acknowledge that is a possibility, but I think it is probably just theoretically possible or, at best, very anecdotal.  Again, exceptions cannot drive the continuation of the ML R5 draft.] 
• Players are emotionally scarred if they don't make it to the make it to the majors as a ML R5 draftee. [NOTE: I have anecdotal evidence that this is true from interviewing players who have been ML R5 draftees but, to my knowledge, no studies have been done to show that this is true.]
• Players not returned suffer developmental delays in their baseball career as a result of being 'stashed' on a big league roster (and bench) for a season, seldomly playing. [NOTE: Another example of something that appears to be obvious.  My research did show that many of these players were sent back to the minors (sometimes the low minors) the season following their ML R5 draft season, staying in the minors, sometimes, for a number of seasons before they returned to the major leagues for good. However, my research failed to show that this stashing occured frequently nor was it necessarily a factor in delaying their development, nor did it show that players met the criteria of low usage in their first year that might lead you to believe they were just being stashed.  Rather, players who are returned to their original team don't appear to develop any faster or turn into better players than those who are NOT returned and are seldomly used in their first ML season.]

THE ML R5 DRAFT THAT NEVER HAPPENED

In 2021, teams set their ML rosters and their AAA reserve lists as usual, but the ML R5 draft never happened that year due, in part, to the lockout as the new CBA was still being negotiated.  This gave a unique chance for study of what would happen if the ML R5 draft was abolished and prospects who might have otherwise been drafted just stuck with their original team until they were rostered or just became 6 year minor league free agents..  That is, a lot of the proponents of the ML R5 draft point to the all-stars, MVPs and HOFers that have come out of this draft without considering whether those players would have achieved the same status if they had just staying with the organization that had spent years and lots of money to sign and develop them.

So let's take a look at some of the significant players who would have been available for the 2021 ML R5 draft and what happened to them in 2022 and in 2023-2025.  I will admit that, at this point, I am worn down from the research that I have done for this article.  I also acknowledge that I was not able to find, for 2021, an article like I found for 2025 that listed all the top prospects for each team that were or were not protected against the ML R5.  So the list I am about to give you is absolutely anecdotal, but it's the best I could do at the moment;  So here is the list of significant prospects I have found who were not protected against the 2021 ML R5 draft that never happened [NOTE: list is in no particular order]::

1. Yainer Diaz

2. Oscar Gonzalez

3. Will Benson

4. Joey Cantillo

5. Cooper Hummel

6. Lenyn Sosa

7. Kody Clemens

8. Jordan Diaz

Obviously this is just a cursory look.  I am sure if I could see a list of the top prospects team chose NOT to protect in 2021 more names would jump out.  In addition, teams had their lists of players they would consider drafting that migh be in addition to the list above.  Just by inspection, this looks like a pretty decent list of players who could have easily been lost had there been a ML R5 draft in 2021.  The takeaway for me from this list is that players succeed or fail, in many cases, irrespective of the organization they are in but, rather, based on how talented they are.  It supports the presumption that a number of the biggest success stories coming out of the ML R5 draft would have been successes if there had NOT been a ML R5 draft.  

In my opinion, this just adds to my feeling that the ML R5 draft is not needed and, in fact, can actually hurt the teams it should be helping, the resource-limited teams.

Guardians Trades from 2016 to Present

In honor of Rule 5 roster setting day tomorrow, I am dusting this article that I published this March about how good the Cleveland Guardians are at making trades.  The reason it is in honor of the roster setting day on Tuesday is that we traded Nolan Jones for Juan Brito on that day in 2022 and, three seasons later, Jones had one good season and Brito has burned all 3 of his minor league options leaving the Guardians hoping for a 4th option to be granted.  In sunmary, except for a few memorable trades, they have sucked at making trades over the past 10 years.  No small market team with a very small payroll can afford to suck at trades but, for the most part, we do.  Here's the data, updated with trades we have made since March:

 I was challenged on X to do something I had wanted to do for a while: look at how well the Guardians have been at making trades.

So let's take a look, going back to the 201-2016 off-season, at how the Guardians have done.

But first, here are the ground rules:

•  I will only look at trades that have TURNED OUT to be significant or was thought to be a significant trade at the time
• 'Significant', for me, is defined as a trade in which one of more of the players traded has a future impact on the team or, in a few rare cases, are prospects projected to have that impact.
• A few of the most recent trades I have graded (e.g., Civale/Manzardo) may change categories over time.
• If I have missed an important trade, I apologize. But I don't believe that a single trade will change the outcome of the analysis below.

With that being said, here goes:

Trades that the Guardians have won

• Andrew Miller for Heller, Clint Frazier, Justus Sheffeld, Feyereisen
• Hedges, Quantrill, Josh Naylor, Arias, Cantillo, Owen Miller for Clevinger, Greg Allen, Matt Waldron
• Clase, DeShields for Kluber
• Kyle Manzardo for Aaron Civale

Trades that the Guardians have lost

• Carlos Santana, Jake Bauers for Encarnacion, Yandy Diaz and Cole Sulser
• Trevor Bauer for Scott Moss, Yasel Puig, Frnmil Reyes, Logan Allen, Victor Nova
• Horwitz, Mitchell for Gimenez, Sandlin
• Myles Straw for Yainer Diaz, Maton
• Juan Brito for Nolan Jones
• Justin Boyd, AJ Hajjar for Will Benson
• Junior Caminiero for Tobias Myers
• Kody Huff for Cal Quantrill
• Jefry Rodriguez, Daniel Johnson, Andrew Monasterio for Yan Gomes
• Jean Segura, Khalil Watson for Josh Bell
• Patrick Sandoval for Eddie Rosario
• Kyle Dowdy, Leonys Martin for Willi Castro
• Nolan Jones for Tyler Freeman
• Shane Bieber for Khal Stephen
• NOTHING for Myles Straw, cash and intentional bonus pool money
• Josh Naylor for Slade Cecconi and a Comp B pick.
• Alex Cobb for Jacob Bresnahan

Trades that are roughly even

• Lindor, Carrasco for Gimenez, Rosario, Wolf, Greene
• Lane Thomas for Jose Tena, Alex Clemmey, Rafael Ramirez, Jr.
• Brad Hand, Adam Cimber for Francisco Mejia
• Scott Barlow for Enyel De Los Santos
• Amed Rosario for Noah Syndergard
• Ortiz, Hartle and Kennedy for Horwitz
• Lane Thomas for Clemmey, Ramirez and Tena
• Brandon Guyer for Lukes, Salinas

SUMMARY

Looking at this list, the Guardians have made their positive trade reputation on three trades: Clevinger trade, Andrew Miller trade and Clase/Kluber trade, with a fourth trade, the Civale/Manzardo trade, looking like a winner even if Manzardo doesn't become any more than he was in 2025, a slow-footed liability at first base who hits some homeruns.  That's 4 trades in 10 years and while those were huge wins, they were the only wins, meaning that the Guardians have only won or broken even on 12 out of 28 trades, or 43% of their trades in the past 10 years, and actually have 'won' only 14%.

• 4 trade wins
• 16 losses
• 8 roughly even exchanges

Conventional wisdom would be that teams have to make good on at least 25%, break even on 50% and lose 25%. In essence, they have to at least break even on talent gained and lost, bringing in talent at positions of need and trading their excess  However, a small market club like Cleveland probably needs to do better than that (say, winning 30%, breaking even on 50% and losing 20%) as they can't make up for their trade or draft mistakes by signing expensive free agents.  The Guardians are at 14%, 28% and 58%.

The front office (including the managers and coaching staff) in Cleveland has been UNBELIEVABLE in putting together great teams and giving the fans an unbelievable product for a long time.  Looking at the results of the trades they have made in almost the last decade even makes their performance better because, frankly, they haven't been good at making trades, except for a few huge ones. 

Again, a front office of a small team needs to do better than the Guardians have done on trades, FAR better.  As we enter trade season, starting with roster freeze season, let's remember this.  And, to begin with, let's hope tomorrow doesn't bring any stupid Rule 5-motivated trades. 

I can already tell, looking at trade proposals from some people who write about the Guardians, that these writers don't expect enough from their team in terms of making trades. But you kinda get used to what you get without expecting enough.  We need to expect much more from our FO.

How To Fix Baseball - Part 6 - In Game Rule Changes I Think Will Help the Game

 Parts 1-5 in this series dealt with changes I think will impact competitive balance going forward in baseball.  All these proposed changes would have to be negotiated between the owners and the MLBPA in the next collective bargaining agreement.

What I will discuss in this final segment in this series is changes in in-game rules.  These changes would not require inclusion in the next CBA and, so, could be implemented starting next season.  One such change, the use of a challenge system for ball and strike calls, is already due to be implemented in 2026.

Let's talk about some other changes (NOTE: I may update this over the winter as I read/jear other ideas).

LOWERING OR RAISING OF PADDING ON OUTFIELD WALLS TO ELIMINATE DEBATE REGARDING BALLS GETTING STUCK UNDER THE PADDING

 From the controversy in the recent World Series, I propose that padding on outfield (fair and foul territory) be raised 6 inches to a height of one foot above the ground.  This will eliminate balls being caught underneath padding.  This could also be accomplished by lowering the padding to no more than one inch above the warning track but it just seems to make sense to raise it a little to avoid shoes getting caught under the padding.  

I would also like to see a committee look at all 30 ML parks and even parks that have been replaced to review what, if anything, needs to be done to limit the number of dead balls generated during a game. 

CHECK SWING AND APPEALING IT

Currently the catcher or pitcher needs to ask the home plate umpire to appeal whether a player has checked him swing on a pitch.  It is obvious now from instant replay that these challenges could be handled as other challenges are during the game, by replay evaluation in the New York replay office.  

After seeing how black and white some of these calls would be using a camera that was directly across from the batter, I am suggesting that 

(a) The rule be clarified on what is and is not a check swing 

(b) Create a rule that says the team in the field can still ask for a determination of a check swing as they do now but that determination can be the source of a challenge separate from the challenge system used for other in-game challenges

(b) Two unsuccessful challenges be granted to each team each game to challenge check swings

This rule changes seems like a no-brainer to me, given the state of the video technology.

RULES RELATIVE TO TWO-WAY PLAYERS

What has been dubbed the Ohtani rule allows a starting pitcher to hit and, once they are removed from the game as a pitcher, they can remain in the game as a designated hitter at the same spot in the order they were in as the pitcher.  This seems like letting a team have their cake and eat it to if they have an exceptional hitter who is also a pitcher.

I suggest changing the rule to say that a starting pitcher who is removed may stay in the game as a hitter if they go to a fielding position.  The team then designates another player to be the DH who then hits in the position in the order for the player removed from the game.  

While this eliminates some of the advantage to having a two-way player it still gives them the advantage of keeping the player in the game and is more in line with the way the playing rules used to be before the DH was implemented throughout baseball.

GHOST RUNNER

Though some people see the high drama in 16 inning games being good for the game, I don't.  Look at game 7 of this year's world series.   Quality starting pitchers pitching on 0 or 1 day's rest because it is an all hands on deck game 7.  I feel the risk of injury out weighs the drama factor.

So, I leave the ghost runner in place for regular season extra inning games.  In the playoffs I modify it to something like college football uses if games continue to go on and on.  Here's how my plan would look in all playoff games

(1) Innings 10-12, no ghost runner.

(2) Innings 13 and beyond, ghost runner at 2nd base like in regular season.

RULES I DON'T THINK NEED TO BE CHANGED

I have seen some rule changes being proposed that I don't think need to be changed: number of disengagements per batter, pitch clock length, the shift rule, go back to no ghose runner in extra innings.

How To Fix Baseball - Part 5 - Various Changes (excluding playing rule changes)

 OK, in parts 2-4 I have addressed, in detail, the major changes that I think will impact competitive balance:

• Salary floor without a salary cap
• Implementing an annual international amateur player draft (plus associated rule changes to give longer control of those players to give them proper development time). Embedded is the requirement that teams with limited resources have to spend more on these drafts. 
• Significant changes to the Rule 4 draft which focus on improving competitive balance and forcing teams with limited resources to spend on player development by increasing their bonus pool, which becomes the mandatory minimum for them to spend on any draft.

In addition to the above, I want to suggest miscellaneous changes that I think will further improve competitive balance. 

ELIMINATION OF THE RULE 5 DRAFT

A number of so-called experts agree with me. The Rule 5 draft should be eliminated for the following reasons:

• It doesn't do what it was designed to do: give prospects a path to the majors that they might not have if they languished in a farm system of the team that signed them. Very few prospects come out of the Rule 5 draft to become impact players in the majors.  Looking over the history of this draft, an argument can easily be made that almost every player who came through the Rule 5 draft and had ML success would have had that same success in their original organization or would have changed organizations via trade and get their ML opportunity that way.
• It creates undue stress on ML organizations trying to decide which players to protect each off-season by the November roster freeze deadline.
• It can needlessly start the option clock for players who are drafted  very young (e.g., international amateur FAs) when those players are not ready for the major leagues.  
• There is some real evidence that shows that being drafted in the Rule 5 can actually stunt a prospect's development, especially if they are kept by the drafting team. In addition, there is needless psychological impact on players who are not placed on the 40 man roster.
• Hoarding of prospects has already been addressed by limiting the number of prospects a team can have in their organization.  This limitation has already led to teams releasing more players from their rookie and low A teams faster than they have before the rule.
• Areas addressed in Parts 2-4 are designed to naturally lead to teams with limited resources having a greater number of quality prospects than they have had in the past.  This advantage would be somewhat negated if those prospects were exposed to the Rule 5 draft.  Bringing prospects to the major leagues is a game of attrition.  Teams with limited resources have to rely on their farm systems for players so the more prospects they have, the greater likelihood there is of having some of those prospects turning into impact players.

So, eliminating the Rule 5 draft with the associated November roster freeze would likely be a plus to most organizations without any loss or gain in competitive balance if the draft is eliminated.

CHANGING THE RULES ON TRADING DRAFT PICKS

In Part 4 I already suggested that trading of Competitive Balance picks should not be allowed as those picks are reserved for teams that are resource-limited.  Allowing small market teams to trade those picks is the opposite of what my changes are proposing, which center on making small market teams spend more money on development and retaining their young major league players.

In fact, as I mentioned in part 4, I am against teams trading ANY draft picks in the first 10 rounds of the draft where the picks are used to generate the draft bonus pool for each team.  History in other sports has 

What I would like to suggest here is that picks in rounds 11-20 become freely tradeable.  These picks likely would have greater value in trade than they have actual value as draft picks.   A possible change to the rule I am proposing would be to not allow competitive balance teams to trade draft picks at all as that would be a way for them not to spend money on player development.  However, they could get around this rule simply by drafting players in rounds 11-20 that have no intention of signing so I am not inclined to include this proviso in my proposal.  Competitive balance teams will quickly find out that they will have a harder time using up all their bonus money if they don't draft players in rounds 11-20 who require bonuses that count against their bonus pool.

INCREASNG THE NUMBER OF COMPETITIVE BALANCE TEAMS TO 15 (up from 10)

There are a lot of teams just outside the competitive balance group that need to be spending more money on their team.  If we increase the number to 15, providing teams 11-15 with 1/2 the revenue sharing dollars teams 1-10 get and tax the large market teams and teams exceeding payroll amounts by some fraction to cover the additional 5 teams, we could pump more money into the bottom teams in the league, as defined by revenue. Concommitant to getting more money, teams 11-15 would have to spend $2.5 million more on the draft and 1.5 million more on signing international amateure free agents.

FIND A BETTER WAY TO CALCULATE AVERAGE ANNUAL VALUE (AAV)

We need to simplify AAV so that the hit against the luxury tax does not improve with deferrals.  In each CBA negotiation there are sticking points that one side or another does not want to budge on.  In my opinion, closing this loophole would only be offensive to a few large money teams and a few players.   There is no way a contract with a real AAV of $70 million a year should present as a $46 million salary just because of deferrals.  

Also, I believe that posting fees should count against a team's payroll.

FInally, I believe that other loopholes that may exist should be closed.  For example, I am not sure if ALL bonuses paid by a team to a player are counted against the AAV of the player's contract.  If this, or other loopholes exist, they need to be closed so we get a true view of what the luxury tax should be.

FANS SHOULD GET TO SEE THE REVENUES VS RE-INVESTMENT NUMBERS

Probably the most controversial thing I am proposing and one with the least chance of success being included in the next CBA, there is so much talk among fans about how much an owner or owners group for a team is taking as profits and how much of their revenue they are reinvesting in their team.  

Therefore, I think an independent auditor should be assigned to generate an impartial accounting of the exact percentage of their revenue a team is reinvesting in their team.  While this has to be available for every team my suggestion is really targeted towards teams getting revenue sharing.  The perception still exists among most fans and the media that teams may be skimming profits instead of reinvesting in their team.  When someone buys a sports franchise, in my opinion, they are buying a toy to play with, not a business to make money.  Businesses cut corners to make profits and what I am suggesting is that baseball teams not be allowed to do that.  One of the most important things for fans is to know if they are investing their dollars going to games that revenue is being applied to make the product (their team) better.  

Note that I am suggesting publication of 4 numbers for each team: total revenues, dollars re-invested in team salaries and other forms of player acquistions (e.g., the draft(s)), amount of revenue going to other costs within the organization and the total of revenues that are not spent on the team (e.g., taken as profits or capital improvements).  Forensic acccountants know much more about this stuff than me but it just seems, without getting into the weeds, we should be able to publish these numbers for fans to see.  This, in turn, would pressure certain owners to spend more on their teams.  

INCREASE MINOR LEAGUE PLAYER LIMITS FOR CERTAIN TEAMS

Currently each major league team is limited to 165 players total in their minor league system.  I propose raising that limit by 10 players (to 175) for the 15 teams that are designated with the least resources in baseball, with a concomitant increase in roster sizes at AA and AAA by 5 each.  Teams do not have to raise their overall roster size but, if they choose to do that, it gives them extra space to add minor league free agents to provide more minor league depth options.  While this won't greatly impact competitive balance, it will give limited resource teams a leg up on depth guys at AAA to help in emergency situations.

RAISE ROSTER LIMITS FOR CERTAIN TEAMS

Allow the 15 most resource0limited teams to have a 42-man roster all year, giving them an advantage over other teams.  Obviously, this would raise the total payroll for these teams but it would also allow them to have more roster flexibility to strengthen their 26-man roster during the season. This would also help in the off-season when 60-day IL players had to be added back to the roster as fewer players would have to be DFA'd.  In addition, it would be obvious if teams did not take advantage of this that they were being cheap. Finally, this would likely not be used for prospects as that would start their option clocks so teams would likely use these spots for AAA depth options, at least in most cases.

How To Fix Baseball - Part 4 - How Do We Fix The Rule 4 Draft*

 The amateur baseball draft, known more precisely as the Rule 4 draft, is held once a year in July.  It consists of 20 rounds and is limited to high school graduates, junior college players and college juniors, seniors and draft-eligible sophomores. It is followed by a period in which teams can sign undrafted but draft-eligible players, called non-drafted free agents (NDFAs).

The draft has evolved since its first year in 1965 with the current version somewhat favoring teams with the worst records in the previous year. Recently, changes were made to the draft creating a draft lottery to disincentivize losing to improve a team's draft slot.  Other changes over the years included giving teams that made the playoffs in the previous year lower draft slots that are based on the round in the playoffs a team lost in, followed by ranking teams that lost in a particular round by the inverse of their record.  Other rules added have been designed to disincentivize losing for many consecutive years and for signing qualifying free agents.  Provisions also exist to remove draft picks if teams exceed their draft budget in a particular year by more than 4.99%.

The two things I would like to see changed in the Rule 4 draft is how the draft order is determined and making teams with limited resources spend a lot of money on this draft.

DRAFT ORDER

I would like to see the following changes in how the draft order is determined:

1. Eliminate the draft lottery

2. Eliminate round of elimination from the playoffs as a determiner of draft order

2. Determine the draft order using the following criteria in this order:

    a. Non-playoff teams draft first

        (1) Competitive balance teams draft first

        (2) Worst 2 records in each league draft next (if not in above group

        (3) Remaining non-playoff teams 

        (4) Highest team payrolls draft first in each category

    b. Playoff teams

        (1) Competitive balance teams draft first, sorted by highest payroll first

        (2) Non-competitive balance teams draft next, sorted by worst record.  

As an example of how this would work, see Appendix 1 below to see how this would work compared to the raw draft order for the 2026 Rule 4 draft

DRAFT BUDGETS

Draft budgets would continue to be determined by the sum of a team's draft slot bonuses in the first ten rounds of the draft.  However, all competitive balance teams and the teams with the worst 2 records in each league would have an additional $5 million added to their draft budgets. The catch is that it would be mandatory that teams receiving the extra $5 million would have to spend at least 100% of their draft budget or be fined $10 million.  All teams can, of course, still spend up to 104.99% of their total draft budget without losing future draft picks.

TRADING DRAFT PICKS

Competitive balance teams and other, non-playoff teams from the previous year can't trade draft picks.

Teams that can trade draft picks can only trade picks from rounds 11-20 (competitive balance picks can no longer be traded).  More detail to follow in part 5 of this series

WHAT THESE CHANGES ARE DESIGNED TO DO

The goals of these changes in the Rule 4 draft are to:

(1) Favor teams with limited resources (competitive balance teams) by giving them higher draft picks

(2) Favor competitive balance teams that are spending a lot on payroll over those that aren't

(3) Make competitive balance teams and teams with the worst losing records spend a lot of money on the Rule 4 draft.  Combined with my proposed international draft, competitive balance teams would have to spend $8+ million more each year to acquire amateur talent.  Along with the salary floor I proposed, these changes would significantly increase the mandatory spending teams for the teams that are not spending a lot of money now.

These changes, in lieu of a salary cap, would move teams towards competitive balance by having them spend more on amateur talent instead of spending that money on mediocre ML free agents.

The main drawback to my plan is that the additional money that is being pumped into draft budgets would likely be used on high school players who, previously, went undrafted as teams couldn't meet their bonus demands and stay within their draft budget. Very few quality college players don't get drafted.

APPENDIX 1 - COMPARISON OF CURRENT RAW DRAFT ORDER vs DENNIS' PROPOSAL

Here are MLB's current raw draft order for 2026 and the draft order from my system, assuming that the 10 teams with CB-A and CB-B picks are still going to be: Minnesota, Pittsburgh, Baltimore, St. Louis, Miami, KC, Colorado, Cleveland, Detroit and Seattle.  Remember, my system is based on rewarding competitive balance teams and penalizing teams that are not spending much money in payroll.  Advancing further in the playoffs has been removed as a penalty in my system as has, in large degree, rewardng non-playoff teams with the worst records. Penalties for finishing with a bad record too many years in a row are no longer necessary but other penalties (e.g., FA signings, leauge imposed penalties, etc.) will still be in place. The draft lottery will be discontinued under my system.

Pick    Current Raw Draft Order                Dennis Changes Draft Order

1.               White Sox                                         Baltimore            

2.                Minnesota                                        KC

3.                Pittsburgh                                        St. Louis

4.                Baltimore                                        Minnesota

5.                Athletics                                         Colorado

6.                Atlanta                                            Pittsburgh

7.                Tampa Bay                                     Miami

8.                St. Louis                                        New York Mets

9.                Miami                                            Houston

10.              Colorado                                        Texas

11.              Washington                                    Atlanta

12.              LA Angels                                     LA Angels

13.              Arizona                                         San Francisco

14.             Texas                                             Arizona

15.             San Francisco                                Washington

16.            KC                                                   Tampa Bay

17.             NY Mets                                        Chicago White Sox

18.             Houston                                          Athletics                                         

19.            Cincinnati                                        Seattle

20.            Boston                                              Detroit

21.            San Diego                                        Cleveland

22            Cleveland                                         Cincinnati                                         

23.            Detroit                                             Boston

24.            Chicago Cubs                                   San Diego                              

25.            New York Yankees                           Chicago Cubs

26.             Philadelphia                                     LA Dodgers

27.            Seattle                                               New York Yankees

28.            Milwaukee                                         Toronto                                     

29.             Toronto                                             Philadelphia

30.            LA Dodgers                                        Milwaukee

 OK, that's it for for this time. Next time we will talk about various miscellaneous rule changes that impact competitive balance and the final blog post in this series will look at various game-based rule changes.   

How Do We Fix Baseball - Part 3 - The International Amateur Draft

 

This post will discuss what I consider the single most important step we can put in place to increase competitive balance, long term, in baseball: institute a separate international draft each year on January 15th and change slightly the rules of years of player control and Rule 5 draft eligibility.  Why, you may ask, do I think an international amateur draft is important?

Currently, although there is some nuance to it, international amateur free agents can generally be signed after their 16th birthday.  Each year there is a signing period that runs from January 15th through mid-December.  There are international signing budgets that teams are supposed to stick to and, while the most recent CBAs have added some teeth to penalties for teams exceeding those budgets, the penalties are not nearly as severe as exceeding a budget in the US amateur draft (Rule 4 draft).  

As it stands now, teams 'negotiate' with the 'trainers' of these young Latin American players to, essentially, lock these kids into an organization as early as 14 years old, in anticipation of the kids signing when they turn 16.  While these commitments are non-binding, these understandings are pretty strong and I think we should find a way to eliminate them and make international amateur acquisitions favor the weaker teams. 

So, how would an international amateur draft work?

(1) As amateur baseball and travel leagues do not exist in Latin American countries to the extent they do in the US, group training and player evaluation combines would have to be set up by MLB to help identify the best players for each draft cycle.  This includes age verification.  Unlike the current system, players would only be able to be drafted if they are 16 years old on the date of the draft.

(2) Each international draft will be five rounds and the draft order will be set based solely on the inverse order of winning percentage in the previous ML season.  There would be no adjustment for playoff teams vs non-playoff teams and penalties for exceeding a draft budget would be the same as in the Rule 4 draft.

(3) Teams would be assigned draft budgets based on their draft slot values, just like they are for the Rule 4 draft and the same penalties would apply for the Rule 4 draft relative to loss of draft picks.

(4) After the 5 rounds teams could sign, as NDFAs, as many players as their would be allowed under the roster restrictions MLB has on DSL players.  Like the Rule 4 draft, an upper limit on bonuses of these NDFAs would be set up and bonuses larger than those limits would count against a team's draft budget.  

(5) To spur competitive balance, I propose giving revenue sharing teams an additional $3 million over their draft budgets that they HAVE to spend on signing international amateur players from the draft or as NDFAs.  

(6) The rules on player control and Rule 5 draft eligibility have to change, too. Players signed before they turn 17 years old would be under the control of a team for 7 years after they are drafted and their Rule 5 eligibility is pushed back one year from the current level.  These players are also automatically granted a 4th option year unless they make it to the major leagues before they are Rule 5-eligible for the first time.  These changes would address what currently happens where really good prospects are protected on the 40 man roster long before they are prepared to play in the major leagues, burning up all their option years before they can establish themselves in the majors.

OK, that's it for the international draft.  Next time we will talk about changes to the Rule 4 draft.